



तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय

SANTINIKETAN
VISWA BHARATI
LIBRARY

940.4

R 54

PERSONALITY AND NATIONALITY

Personality and Nationality

A STUDY IN RECENT HISTORY

BY

RICHARD ROBERTS

LONDON

HEADLEY BROTHERS

BISHOPSGATE

CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
	FOREWORD - - - - -	7
I.	MODERN GERMANY AND MODERN ENGLAND: A CONTRAST -	13
II.	WHERE HAS GERMANY GONE WRONG?	36
III.	PERSONALITY AND NATIONALITY -	53
IV.	EMPIRE AND ETHICS - - -	76
V.	A WORLD SET FREE - - -	102
VI.	"PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF" - -	119

FOREWORD

ONE of the most pressing questions raised for the people of these islands by the war in which we are now involved is whether we have a genuine part to play in the world-history of the future. Our young men are to-day thronging the recruiting offices in order to offer themselves for the defence and preservation of their country. Are we worth it? Have we any right to suppose that we still have something of so much worth to give to the world that it justifies us in maintaining our national existence at so tremendous a cost? We have had a long and wonderful history. May it not be that now our great innings is drawing to its close? Those who have been influencing the German mind in the matter of world-politics in recent years have affected to believe and have not hesitated to preach that we are a decadent people, that our vitality is exhausted and that our day is done. Is there any truth in this? Is there anything in our national life which lends credibility to this view?

That our national vitality is very far from being exhausted the events of the past few weeks have conclusively shown. We have revealed to the world astonishing reserves of strength and courage, a fine sensibility to what the nation has deemed to be the call of honour and chivalry; and the battlefields of Northern France have shown that we have not lost our skill and daring in arms. There is no sign of decadence in us at the present time in the things that influence the course of secular history. Apparently we are quite

sound in wind and limb, and we are justified in believing that we have yet a work to do in the world which is far from being accomplished, if we are to judge by the quality and the quantity of the "things that remain" to us. But are we sure what this work is? What is our mission in the world?

When we penetrate beneath the sequence of events which led to the present war and consider those deep and broad streams of idea and sentiment which determine the aims and policies of statecraft, we are confronted by a plain issue. In this issue there are several strands which require to be separated and considered by themselves; and this we shall hope presently to do. But one aspect of this issue may be suggested at this point inasmuch as it is the justification of the entire thesis of this little book. We have seen Pan-Germanism preparing to "bestride the world like a Colossus," to obliterate the walls of partition and the bounds of their habitation appointed by Providence for the peoples of the earth, and to impose the stamp of German "*kultur*" upon all the nations. Pan-Germanism is a denial of the principle of nationality; and for that simple reason it was doomed to failure from the start. Nationality is not to be destroyed either by howitzer guns or the imposition of an alien culture. Its roots are far too deep and prehensile to be dislodged by a process of assault, whether physical or intellectual. Indeed, it is the paradox of the spirit of nationality that the more it is assailed and oppressed the more it thrives. It may succumb to coddling, but it is never destroyed by force. It should have been, at this stage in the history of the world, plain to the

most limited intelligence that the principle of nationality is essential to the fullness of human progress. "History declares," says Lord Bryce, "that no nation, however great, is entitled to try to impose its type of civilization on others. No race, not even the Teutonic or the Anglo-Saxon, is entitled to claim the leadership of humanity. Each people has in its own time contributed something that was distinctively its own and the world is far richer thereby than if any one race, however gifted, had established a permanent ascendancy."* This is a true philosophy of history. To each nation its own genius by which it makes its own contribution to the wealth of the race.

The United Kingdom is a confederation of small nations, and so much of our strength arises from this circumstance that it would be a singular anomaly were we to prove in the future false to the principle of nationality. Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in that extraordinary medley of good sense and nonsense, "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," has an instructive discussion of nationality in which he maintains that noble nations are produced by the fusion of two different types followed by strict in-breeding.† He gives England as an instance. "We see the English race arising out of a mutual fusion of separated but closely related Teutonic tribes; the Norman invasion provides in this case the last brilliant touch." He appears to think that in this mixture the part played by the Celtic elements is inconsiderable; but his view is based upon the doubtful theory that

* *Daily Chronicle*, Oct. 5th, 1914.

† "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," p. 284.

the Anglo-Saxons drove the Celts altogether into the remote and unfriendly regions of the North and West, where they remained. It is far more in accordance with the facts (and with the result) that the Anglo-Saxons absorbed the original Celtic inhabitants of the English lowlands. It is this circumstance that accounts for the very distinct individuality of the Englishman as contrasted with the purer Continental Teuton. The truth is that the peoples of the British Isles are far more commingled than the existence of no less than four different spoken languages among them would seem to suggest. For there is a *Britannic* type; and it is usually very easily recognised. At any rate, a Continental observer would find extreme difficulty in sorting us out. We are all "*Anglais*" in France. The crossing and inbreeding have done their work, and so we are what we are.

And it is idle to pretend that we are not proud of the type. Its achievements in the world entitle us to a certain wholesome pride in it. Its record has not always been clean and there are pages in our history which we could wish forgotten. But even in lawless adventures, in enterprises about which there was much that is questionable, we may perceive a daring, a *sang-froid*, an imaginativeness, an instinct of chivalry, a power of endurance, a doggedness which, despite their use, make our hearts warm. Drake on Plymouth Hoe, Harry Morgan on the Spanish Main, Nelson and his blind eye, Gordon on the steps of the Residency at Khartoum, and the British soldiers on the battlefields of France to-day,—they are all hewn out of the same rock. The breed is not yet played out. We

have not outlived our strength and there is work for us yet to do in the world.

Perhaps the greatest thing this war can do for us is to clear our minds concerning our national vocation. We declare that we are not at war to-day to gain anything for ourselves. Our portion will be blood and pain and tears. We have no mind for the spoils of war, and we are seeking no aggrandisement. This war is, nevertheless, a very real crisis for Great Britain. It has been already a revelation of our undiminished strength. But to what end shall we use our strength? Are we going to subordinate it to material ends, to the expansion of our markets and the increase of riches? Is our long history with all its splendour to fizzle out in a hustling commercialism? Or is there a more excellent way?

"Non nobis solum, sed toti mundo nati." Our British heritage entails a great and sacred obligation. We are trustees for the world. To-day we are standing at the cross-roads. In a swift, irresistible revelation, God has spoken to us. The moral tragedy of Germany is a word of God thundered at us in a way that is not to be mistaken. Pan-Germanism has collapsed like a house of cards, and with it the whole doctrine and the philosophy out of which it grew. Over against this *débâcle* is there no sign for us? It appears to me we can already "read our title clear," and this book is meant to be a small contribution to that task to which we are all called to-day—the task of discovering what our calling and our election is, and of recovering a true and subduing sense of an authentic world-purpose in the pursuit of which we shall justify all

the goodness and the patience of God towards us and achieve a "latter glory which will be greater than the former glory."

This little book has been somewhat hurriedly written ; and it appears therefore with obvious traces of haste. But it has seemed to the writer that his main plea is sufficiently clear and its urgency so considerable that he is justified in publishing it as it is. When peace comes to be made (as soon, please God, it may) it is essential that we should approach the business of settlement with a clear sense of what our future work in the world is to be ; and it is the writer's humble hope that what he has written here may help, not only to quicken thought upon this subject, but also to confirm on a sure and abiding foundation the national unity for which we are all grateful to-day, and to stimulate that task of domestic reconciliation, in Church, State, and Society, without which it is impossible to look with confidence to the days to come.

The writer would wish to add that while he has tried to show in these pages the implications of the popular view of the issues at stake in the present conflict, he is not thereby committed to a judgment upon war as at any time a justifiable or effectual method of settling international disputes, or upon the policies and tendencies which have involved this country in war at this time. For the immediate purpose of the argument, the chief interest of the war is that it has shown to us afresh those things for which we Britons should and do mostly care ; and the book is an unpretentious endeavour to point the moral.

London, November 10th, 1914.

CHAPTER I

MODERN GERMANY AND MODERN ENGLAND : A CONTRAST

MODERN Germany presents the spectacle of a nation whose entire life has been dominated by the aspiration after national greatness and the sense of a great world-destiny. "A congeries of principalities and free cities" has under the pressure of this ambition been welded into a seemingly united whole. The doctrine has been preached and taught in school, university and church, and from the least to the greatest, from the youngest to the oldest, the whole nation has in varying degrees been inoculated with this great passion. Whether Germany has rightly interpreted its world-mission, whether it has gone the right way about the attainment of it, what the deeper and more abiding consequences of this view have been in its inner life,—these are things which will fall to be considered at a later point. What it is desired to emphasize here is that we have before us in modern Germany the striking and suggestive phenomenon of a whole nation ordering its life with a steady and unrelaxing eye upon the future and upon what it conceives to be its destiny.

Students of modern Germany all bear unvarying witness to the growing perfection of the organisation of its interior life. Mr. Price Collier, in an interesting

description of the street-cleaning department of Berlin, tells us that "it is recruited from soldiers who have served their time, not over thirty-five years of age, and who must pass a doctor's examination and be passed also by the police. The rules as to their conduct, their uniforms, their rights and their duties, down to such minute carefulness as that they may not smoke on duty 'except when engaged in peculiarly dirty and offensive labour,' are here as in all official matters in Germany outlined in labyrinthine detail. Sickness, death, accident, are all provided for with a pension, and there are also certain gifts of money for long service. The police and the street-cleaning department co-operate to enforce the law where private companies or the city-owned street railways are negligent in making repairs or in replacing pavement that has been disturbed or destroyed. There is no escape. If the work is not done properly and satisfactorily, it is done by the city, charged against the delinquent and collected."* This is characteristic of the temper by which Germany is managed throughout; and though the same perfection of organisation has not been achieved in all directions and in all parts of the Empire, things have been moving steadily in that way.

II

All this is part of the great programme. In the interests of the world-mission of Germany, its inner life must be made as clean, as wholesome and as strong as possible. It is perhaps in the building up of its educational system that this policy has been carried out

* "Germany and the Germans," pp. 214, 215.

most thoroughly and is seen at its best. The system has been frequently described, and it is unnecessary to deal with the matter at any length here.* In spite of the admittedly unfinished state of the organisation of national education, it probably stands out to-day as the most thorough endeavour made in any country to educate its people. The scheme is not uniform in all parts of Germany, but the local departures from the type do not remove the general impression of close and extensive co-ordination throughout the Empire. It arises out of this circumstance that illiteracy is rare in Germany. Less than three per thousand of men called up for military service are returned as illiterate, whereas in France the proportion is fifty, in Austria two hundred and ten, and in Russia seven hundred.

It is in the department of technical education that the greatest strides have been made in recent years. For instance, there are eleven great central technical high schools with faculties of architecture, building construction, mechanical engineering, chemistry and general science. They have the power to confer the degree of Doctor of Engineering and generally take rank with the Universities. In addition, there are Agricultural High Schools and Institutes, Veterinary High Schools, Schools of Mining and Forestry, Commercial Schools, Schools of Art and Industry; a Naval School at Kiel, a Colonial Institute at Hamburg, with sixty professors and tutors, for training

* Those who are interested may find full accounts of the German educational system in Price Collier, "Germany and the Germans," pp. 275 ff.; and Charles Tower, "Germany of To-day," pp. 129 ff.

men for colonial careers. The system of continuation schools which continue the work of the elementary schools gives a thorough practical education on a less academic plane than the technical schools; and a government regulation empowers towns with more than twenty thousand inhabitants to compel commercial employees under the age of eighteen to attend the continuation schools a certain number of hours a week, and to fine employers who interfere with such attendance. In Berlin this regulation, which applies generally to boys only, is applied to girls; and there are no less than 30,000 girls attending classes in cooking, dress-making, laundry-work, domestic economy, and where it is asked for, office work. The ramifications of this system of technical education seem endless. "At Dortmund . . . you may begin with horse-shoeing in the cellar, and go up through the work of carpenter, mason, plumber, sign-painter, poster designer, to the designing of stained-glass windows and the modelling of animals and men."

It is not to be supposed that this minuteness of provision for all classes and kinds of education represents the last stage in the educational progress of the German Empire. On the contrary, keen minds are for ever perfecting it in this detail and that. Nevertheless, as it stands, it is a wonderful achievement. Consider, for instance, our English methods in the light of this statement: "The names of the different kinds of schools vary a little, and the school course may show local differences, but speaking broadly it is very nearly true that a family with young boys transferred from East to West or North to South, could find a school of

the same type and with the same course of study as the boys had been accustomed to attend, so that their school course would suffer very little interruption from the change."*

Our elementary school system in this country is approaching some degree of uniformity, but beyond that stage we are yet for the most part in a state of inexcusable confusion. A middle-class family removing from one London suburb to another is confronted with a task of the utmost difficulty when it sets itself to provide for the continuation of the children's education. It is to be observed that we are not now speaking of the content of German education, but only of its organisation; and we may sum up the matter in another quotation from Mr. Price Collier, "If one considers the range of instruction from the *Volkschulen* (elementary schools) and the *Fortbildungsschulen* (continuation schools) up . . . to the universities and then on beyond that to the thousands still engaged as students in the commerce and industry of Germany, as for example the technically employed men in the Krupp works at Essen or the Colour works at Elberfeld, to mention two of hundreds, it is seen that Germany is gone over with a veritable fine tooth-comb of education. There is not only nothing like it, there is nothing comparable to it in the world."†

III

If we turn to the problem of housing the working classes, we find a similar thorough-going purpose.*

* Charles Tower, "Germany of To-day," pp. 136 f.

† Price Collier, "Germany and the Germans," pp. 281 f.

We have been accustomed to regard this problem as being specially acute in England, but conditions have prevailed in Berlin with which London compares favourably. In 1905, in London six per cent. of the population lived in one-room tenements; in Berlin, forty-one per cent. In London, fifteen per cent. lived in dwellings of two rooms; in Berlin, thirty-three per cent. In London, forty-six per cent. of the population lived in houses of four or more rooms; in Berlin, only twelve per cent. Further, the average weekly rent paid by the German workman in towns was in that year nearly twenty-five per cent. higher than that of the British workman.* There are peculiar elements in the housing problem in Berlin which make it exceedingly difficult to negotiate; but it has long been evident to German statesmen that their hope of national greatness was compromised by the existence of this evil. For one thing they were confronted with a declining birth rate, the gravest of all national perils. They have, therefore, set themselves to tackle this problem with characteristic thoroughness. It is true that the housing question is almost entirely being handled by the municipalities, but it is not to be doubted that the stimulus has come from more exalted and powerful quarters. Mr. Tower tells us that most of the large German towns have adopted four means of regulating the house problem. The first is a system of municipal house agencies, of which in 1909 there were fifteen. The second is by inspection of houses and lodgings, "on lines characteristically thorough and unsensational." This is an activity yet in its infancy, and it lags

* Charles Tower, "Germany of To-day," p. 120.

behind our English enterprise in the same direction. The third means is "the municipal purchase of land, and either the direct or mediate construction of suitable workmen's dwellings and the exclusion thereby of the reckless ground speculator. In general, the governments of the German states encourage and perhaps do their best to assist this form of municipal undertaking." Between 1900 and 1906, as much as £40,000,000 was spent in the erection of workmen's dwellings. Breslau, Kiel, Frankfurt, Mannheim, Düsseldorf, Metz, Duisburg have municipal building schemes in progress, and large private firms like Krupps, the Baden-Aniline Factory and others have provided no less than 200,000 workmen's dwellings. The fourth method of meeting the housing problem is the imposition of a tax upon suitable building land which is lying waste, and upon the increase in land values. Here, therefore, as in the business of education, we see a thorough-going organisation of conditions for the general welfare and progress of the German people.

IV

It is unnecessary to describe the long list of German experiments for the production of a strong and vigorous national vitality. We know how in such matters as unemployment, State insurance, the relief of poverty, provision for old age, other countries have turned to Germany to borrow from her experience. Forest open-air schools for sickly children, what a recent writer has called "the most wonderful tuberculosis sanatoria, convalescent homes and .

hospitals,"—these and many more things testify to the minute care with which the soil of national life is being tilled in Germany. Most of all, perhaps, do we see the zeal for German greatness manifesting itself in the encouragement given on all hands to industrial enterprise. We have already observed how education has been laid under tribute to industrial progress. "The German student has one inestimable advantage, namely, that the professors at the German Universities are by no means only theorists. The supervision exercised by the State over its Universities ensures that where practical science is required a practical scientist shall teach it. Hence to some extent the old aloofness of the lecture room is made baseless, and the combination of practice and theory, the wedding of science and technique, which is the basis of material progress, is introduced into the Universities as it is into the technical high schools. An inventor of importance is always sooner or later the expounder to students of his own discoveries."* That a great deal of the produce of German manufacture is of inferior quality and is intended more for the benefit of the producer than the satisfaction of the consumer is, of course, a commonplace. But it would be absurd to suppose that it is more than a very partial description of German industry. The story of the German capture of the aniline dye industry is one of the great reproaches upon the quality of British enterprise, and it is due almost entirely to the harnessing of scientific laboratory work to industrial processes. The great chemical industry in Germany, it has been said, "is the direct

* Charles Tower, "Germany of To-day," p. 154.

produce of German technical education, for the technical schools and university laboratories may be regarded as the corner stone of the nation's greatness and the whole foundation of its supremacy in chemical industry." And as in chemistry, so elsewhere,—in the application of electricity, for instance. It is true that the industrial development of modern Germany has been mostly the result of intelligent private enterprise, but it owes no little of its progress to the wise co-operation of the Government. One illustration of this may perhaps suffice. The extension of the railway system has been carried on with great activity. Since 1870 the mileage of the German State-owned railways has been increasing by leaps and bounds; and in Prussia especially the railway service has been managed not only as a source of income but as an adjunct to commerce and industry. "Rates for transporting building material for the shipping industry were immediately lowered when the shipping industry required national support; rates for agricultural produce are lowered when agriculture needs a helping hand; and the development of regular agricultural railway traffic is a prominent feature of Prussian administration."* The same writer goes on to say that "the nationalisation of railways after the war (of 1870) was one of the deliberate contributions of the States to the rapid development of industry." The same is true of the canal policy, which had led in 1911 to an inland water traffic of eighty million tons, carried by twenty thousand vessels of various kinds.*

* Chas. Tower, "Germany of To-day," p. 167.

V

All this makes a very remarkable story. But we should be over-rash in concluding that the result has been to make Germany an earthly paradise for its people. Admittedly the process is in an unfinished state, and the dislocation produced by the present war makes it certain that it cannot be resumed with any thoroughness for a long time to come. Nor must we allow ourselves to suppose that the inevitable interference with private and personal interests which this extensive organisation has involved has entailed such hardships as we in this country with our ideals of personal liberty would probably imagine, and would ourselves most hotly resent. It is true that the German has no little faculty for grumbling; but when his grumble is over he falls into line again quietly and accepts the situation. Indeed, from his earliest youth he is trained and disciplined to this view of his obligations. In the elementary schools the great emphasis is laid in moral instruction on "the character of a patient and obedient link in a chain." Obedience and discipline,—here are the roots of the German character, and the whole course of the training of the German citizen makes for complete submission to organised authority. It has to be remembered that in most countries domestic reforms have proceeded from below. They have been wrested by the common people from their unwilling "betters." But in Germany the movement has been in the opposite direction. The present Emperor wrote to Bismarck in 1890: "It is the duty of the State to regulate the duration and the conditions of work in such manner

that the health and the morality of the working-man may be preserved, and that his needs may be satisfied and his desire for equality before the law assured." This was well spoken, and the ideal of a paternal State has in it much that is attractive. But this paternalism has taken the form of a somewhat forced "intensive culture" of the German nation, which has hardly been consulted in the matter at all. An extensive and exacting form of organisation has been imposed upon the people and its success so far is simply due to the circumstance that the whole training of German youth renders it exceedingly docile and ductile. If the leaders of Germany have shown great genius of organisation, the German people have shown an equal amenability to being organised. The State shepherds them from the cradle with a crook of iron. Their school training, their army training, their general over-organisation have led to a "veritable imprisonment of the will." "State socialism as thus far put in practice in Germany is in a nutshell the decision on the part of the State or the rulers that the individual is not competent to spend his own money, to choose his own calling, to use his own time as he will, or to provide himself for his own future and for the various emergencies of life. And by minute State control, they are rapidly bringing the whole population to an enfeebled political condition where they can do nothing for themselves."* Friendly observers of modern Germany are almost all agreed upon the perils of the mixture of dragooning and coddling which seems to be the policy of the Government in respect of the

* Price Collier, "Germany and the Germans," p. 365.

people, and there can be no question that it makes for the stamping out of individuality and initiative, and breeds a helpless dependence upon leadership.

The truth seems to be that the whole system is vitiated by another factor present in the minds of those who are controlling modern Germany. The endeavour to improve social conditions has been carried out without a sufficient recognition of the value and the sacredness of personality ; and therefore it stands out of relation to the deepest realities of the situation and is bound to miscarry. There is an obvious fallacy in the German conception of the State, which instead of being the organ and the executive of the public mind, is its divinely appointed guardian and director, and which must work out its own purposes irrespective of the will of the individual. But it is no less clear that this conception of the State, while it has its roots in German history, has been enormously hardened and strengthened by the growth of the Pan-German ideal. The exaggerated and inflated teaching prevalent in recent years concerning the glorious world-destiny of the German empire has exalted the State to a position of almost divine authority. The ideal of a powerful State has in its turn led to the extraordinary military development of the past generation, with its production of a powerful and overbearing military caste,—and this has introduced into German life a factor of disintegration which has done much to diminish the good which might have accrued from “ an orderliness, safety and care for the people by the State, unequalled elsewhere in the world.”

Nor should we allow ourselves to imagine that the

industrial machine, in spite of its wonderful organisation, runs altogether smoothly. It has been said that "the capitalist could scarcely ask a better training school for his employées than the German Army." Nevertheless the worm does sometimes turn. In 1911 there were no less than 2,566 strikes, affecting 10,000 firms and 600,000 workmen. Indeed, the very amenability to discipline produced by the army experience of the German worker has become one of the most powerful factors in the war against capitalism. No political movement in the world is so well organised as the Social Democratic party in Germany. Its very perfection of organisation may be one of its greatest weaknesses, for it entails a too implicit dependence on leadership, and the German heads of government know that the voice of the Social Democratic party is the voice of a small junta of leaders obediently echoed and registered by the marshalled and mobilised rank and file. German Social Democracy has hitherto been highly fortunate in its leaders ; but good leaders do not necessarily make a strong and effective movement. Where organisation does the work of enthusiasm, where the unity is of order and not of personal faith, there is no great and abiding potency. Nevertheless let it be admitted that the great German Socialist journal, *Vorwaerts*, with its courage and the daring of its criticism, would be impossible were it not that it had an immense and intelligent following. No doubt it would have been extinguished long ago had the German bureaucrats dared to do so.

When, however, we have allowed for all these things, the spectacle Germany has presented to the outer

world for a long time is that of a nation the inner life of which was being assiduously cultivated. The greatest factor in its life has been a steady and thorough-going purpose to make it as strong, as wholesome, and as fruitful as possible in the interests of a splendid and dazzling imperial policy and of an idealised vision of the mission of Germany in the world.

VI

During the Boer War, Lord Rosebery made a historic remark to the effect that we should "muddle through." It is characteristic of our national temper that when at the beginning of the present war the perfection of our military and naval organisation was revealed so that the Navy was mobilised and the Expeditionary Force was landed in France quietly, quickly and without a hitch, we all gasped in gratified astonishment. That the extraordinary rush of recruits which followed the appeal for volunteers should have broken down the War Office arrangements for enlistment ought not to qualify the credit due to those who had delivered us from the reproach and irritation of our usual muddleheadedness in a time of crisis. But we have to confess that we were surprised. We have been so accustomed to the other thing. A cynical psychologist might indeed—not without plausibility—describe us as a people with a singular genius for "muddling through."

We need go no further than the political history of the last few years in order to see how disastrous a faculty we have for involving ourselves in muddles.

The whole story of the education controversy during the last decade is the story of a very bewildering tangle, nor have we even yet found a way of unravelling it. The religious difficulty in elementary education still stands unsolved, and there is no way of describing secondary education among us save by saying that it is in a pitiful chaos. The industrial conflicts of the same period have steadily grown in extent and acuteness, and again and again we have found ourselves in *impasses* which seemed to afford no way out. Even when we have found the way out we have discovered that at the end of that there was another blind alley; and the relations of capital and labour are no nearer satisfactory definition than they were a generation ago. The suffrage movement seemed to have exhausted the resources of British statesmanship. The indescribable and dangerous meanness of the hunger-strike was countered by the hopeless ineptitude of the "Cat-and-Mouse" Bill. The absurdity of it all was enough to make the gods laugh. We crowned this humiliating story of political insolvency by our extraordinary conduct over the Irish question. "I look back," says Professor Jack, "upon the twelve months prior to the war as a very dark period in our history. We were losing confidence in one another. There was a chaos of partial and selfish aims, and the foundations of social order were seriously threatened. It was only too evident that, whichever of the two groups got the upper hand, none of us would submit to its ruling, and the prospect before us was one of endless strife and growing restlessness."* A foreign observer

* *The Christian Commonwealth*, September 23rd, 1914.

looking upon this situation might not unreasonably have inferred that our irreconcilable factiousness was a symptom of national exhaustion, that it was the disintegration of decay. There is some ground to suppose that the leaders of German imperialism staked a great deal upon this view of our national decrepitude. They were mistaken. Beneath all this seeming confusion, our national unity lay secure after all.

VII

How is this frame of mind to be explained? When the history of the last decade comes to be written, two facts will stand out prominently,—the advance of legislation in the interests of social amelioration and the persistency of extreme political bitterness. That so much of the former should have been achieved under the conditions determined by the latter will strike the historian as a very noteworthy achievement. But he will be not a little perplexed to account for the origin and persistency of the bitterness. Probably he will trace it to a combination of circumstances, but in all likelihood he will fix its beginning in point of time to the period of the Boer War. That is not a wholly edifying passage in our history, but undoubtedly the most grievous of the legacies which it bequeathed to us was a volume of partisan rancour which does not even yet seem wholly to have exhausted itself. It is not necessary now to enter into the causes of this disastrous circumstance,—a circumstance far more disastrous in its consequences than the material losses of the war. But it is hardly to be questioned that ever since that time that same quality of intractable and unyielding bitter-

ness has discoloured all our political controversy. We have imported it into other issues far removed from that of its origin, and have succeeded only in distorting and confusing them.

But all this is only a symptom of a disorder or a defect in our national consciousness which we are called upon to enquire into at the present time. We must go back even beyond the Boer War to discover the real origins of our confusion. These lie far deeper than any recent events.

To begin with, we are a mixed people, springing from two main stocks, yet we distinguish among ourselves English, Scotch, Irish, Welsh and Manx nations within these little islands. All these elements have been steadily commingling since their first mutual contact; and there are few parts of the country, except in the remoter districts, in which it is possible to discover wholly pure representatives of the original types. The Norman Conquest, Norse marauders of our coasts who stayed here, Huguenot refugees, Dutch settlers in Lincolnshire—each of these have added their own peculiar contribution to our racial *ensemble*. But the two main strains have been Celtic and Teutonic; and the result has been that we have side by side the courage, the doggedness, the logicity of the Teuton, with the imaginativeness, the vivacity, and the idealism of the Celt. It is in many respects a difficult team to drive, and the collision of these two elements has been the cause of not a few of our muddles. On the other hand, the blending of these same two elements may be said to have been the secret of the quality of British achievements in history.

It would take us too far afield to examine how the mutual relationship and interaction of these two strains have affected the course of domestic history in the British Isles. But it is not an impossible or untenable view that out of this combination has issued the most precious and the most deeply cherished of all our possessions,—our liberty. This is not the place to discuss at length the story of the growth of the liberty of our nation,—civil liberty, religious liberty, the development of the constitutional monarchy, of representative institutions and of democracy. What is characteristic of us to-day is our love of liberty; and if there be one principle beyond all others to the power and sacredness of which our whole history witnesses it is this. Sometimes we have departed from it, and our apostacy has been visited with grievous humiliation, as in the loss of the North American colonies. And here it is to-day, deep and secure within us, our faith in and our love of liberty.

But be it noticed that it is our very love of liberty that leads us to some of those singular paradoxes of political conduct which are characteristic of us. It is because we love liberty that compulsory military service has hitherto been impossible among us; we hate all forms of compulsion. But it is this same love of liberty which makes the advocate of compulsory military service cry out bitterly when he scents any proposed intrusion into his domesticities in an Insurance Act. It is the same circumstance which accounts for the altogether exaggerated sanctity which the doctrine of property has possessed in this country. We claim the right to do what we like with our own, and whether it be a

factory or a bit of land we resent the remotest suggestion of State interference. We raise the cry of "the rights of property" on the slightest provocation. Yet it is this same principle of liberty which has brought us the spaciousness of our lives and has developed in us gifts of individuality, spontaneity and initiative in contrast to the flattening effects of the extensive civil discipline which has prevailed in Germany. Indeed, we have asserted the principle of liberty at times so far that it has interfered with the liberty of other people and has imperilled the common good. That is to love liberty not wisely but too well. There are conditions under which liberty may become its own worst enemy.

This same spirit which involves us in these paradoxes of personal conduct appears in our social and commercial groupings. Our sense of the sacredness of our individual liberties comes to be translated into terms of class or corporation. We saw the medical men up in arms against the encroachment upon their professional privileges which were said to be entailed by the Insurance Act. Indeed, the professional services of the country,—the law, medicine, education—have become more or less close corporations which tend to guard their privileges without sufficient respect to the welfare of the community as a whole. This jealousy for class privileges is seen most conspicuously in the land-owning class. The assumptions which the land-owner tends to make render effective land-legislation in the interests of the community the most difficult of all political enterprises. This is not to say that there are not notable instances of wise and unselfish land-

ownership, as there are, in all classes and groups, individuals with a larger concern for the nation than for their social or professional interests. Nevertheless it is difficult to gainsay the tendency among us to subordinate national interests to those of the narrower group. And all alleged encroachments on social or professional privileges are resisted in the name of liberty.

VIII

But all this involves a misconception of the nature of liberty. Liberty does not mean the absence of restrictions or immunity from vexatious encroachments upon one's privileges. Such a condition is impossible in a social existence. Liberty is the power to choose under what restrictions we shall live; and all true liberty contains within itself the recognition of the duty of accepting willingly a certain range of restrictions. No man yet has understood the doctrine of liberty who does not see implicit in it the obligation to submit gladly to such limitations as may be necessary in order to secure order and security of life. We have to go no farther afield than our relation to our police institutions in order to recognise the truth of this proposition. We submit to our police regulations in the interest of our liberty. We know perfectly well that there would be less liberty if we did not do so. The only alternative to this view of liberty is that which leads logically and inevitably to anarchy. This doctrine of liberty which includes an emphasis upon the willing acceptance of necessary restrictions is the only safeguard from serfdom on the one hand and anarchy on the other.

But among us the motive which would lead us to accept restrictions gladly has been lacking. We look at Germany and we observe how a great compelling vision of national purpose has imposed upon the people a discipline which has reduced liberty almost to a minimum. Such a process would be impossible in England. We are neither by nature nor by training so amenable to discipline as are the German people. It is probable that the German people have regarded the pastoral activities of the State with occasional dissatisfaction and irritation, but the process could not have continued so long were there not a general acquiescence in the view that all the discipline was necessary for the corporate good and for the ultimate purposes of the Empire. Our trouble has been that we have in recent years lacked a conception of our national vocation which could induce in us a readiness to submit to such restrictions as the welfare of the State might appear to call for. The result has been that we have found ourselves in a succession of blind alleys, in politics, in industry, in our social order. Professor L. P. Jack, in the article already quoted, says—"A few months ago we were split up into a multiplicity of groups, each of which was fighting for its own hand. The interests of the community as a whole had been lost sight of; and the efforts which all of the groups were making to prove that its policy was identical with the good of the State only added to the confusion and deepened the feeling of insecurity." We have been too persistent in our individualism and in our class prejudices. We have been too self-confident and assertive in our partisanship; and it is a charge to which we have to plead guilty

that we have been too exclusively grinding our separate axes. We have considered public measures too often from the point of view of their possible consequences to our own personal or family or class or commercial interests. We have not been seriously interested in our municipalities; only a comparatively small proportion of us have troubled to vote at elections. We have forgotten and forsaken our country in our preoccupation with our own personal or class concerns.

But we have seen all this confusion transformed in the twinkling of an eye into a very genuine and real solidarity. Under the pressure of a common danger we have forgotten our differences; we have ceased to talk about personal or sectional rights. Save only in the case of a few incurable reactionaries, our political bitterness has disappeared. We have willingly accepted a range of restrictions which a few months ago we should have regarded as irritating impertinences. The grocer and his customer find the prices of commodities fixed by the State. The business man submits ungrudgingly to the inconvenience of the moratorium. The owners of motor cars await the orders of a commandeering government. We have all gladly put up with a hundred and one minor discomforts and limitations; and we have done so without appreciable complaint. We have discovered among ourselves a new stimulating comradeship. "The change is so great," says Professor Jack, "that at times it is difficult to believe we are living in the same world or that we are the same individuals as we were three months ago. Whether this change is only temporary remains to be

seen. Possibly when the war is over the sophisticating spirit will break out again and we shall return to the strife of social theories and the general *melée* of the groups they severally represent."

But need this happen? Are we, after the war, going to relapse into the bad old individualist and divisive ways? Our solidarity is surely far too good a thing to be sacrificed. How then can it be saved? Surely the answer is sufficiently plain. It can be saved only by the recovery of an ideal of Britain's greatness and purpose in the world which will command our allegiance, and which, for the love we bear her, will make us her willing slaves, rejoicing in the subordination of our own personal interests to her glory and her mission in the world. It is the absence of such a compelling ideal that has imperilled the unity of our national life in recent years, and our future depends upon our recovering and preserving our solidarity through a re-discovery of the vocation which the Divine Wisdom has appointed to us.

CHAPTER II.

WHERE HAS GERMANY GONE WRONG ?

WE have contrasted the orderliness of German progress with the confusion in which we have been entangled in recent years. The difference in temper between the British and the German peoples is profound and unmistakable, but that does not affect the validity of the proposition that the ordered progress of Germany must be traced to a great ideal of national destiny, while our confusions have largely resulted from the absence of a unifying consciousness of national vocation.

We have already seen that German progress has entailed psychological consequences of a very dangerous character to the German people ; but recent events have thrown a very lurid light upon the dangers which the pursuit of the German ideal has entailed beyond the frontiers of the German Empire. It is, perhaps, no exaggeration to say that the conduct of Germany just before and during the war indicates a very grave moral subsidence, and that the ideal which German statecraft has pursued and the methods by which this pursuit has been carried out are entirely condemned by their consequences when these are tested by any generally accepted moral criterion.

I

To trace the growth of the ideals which have determined the policies of modern Germany from their first beginnings would require a historical investigation far beyond the compass of the present volume. Pan-Germanism may be, in the form we know it, a new phenomenon ; but in its essential spirit it is merely a resurrection of the ambitions of Frederick the Great. That the historical judgment of Germany is right in assigning a high place to the personality and achievements of " old Fritz " need not be argued. In his own day " all Europe, friend and foe alike, were at one in the conviction that a greater Prince had never sat on a throne."* Curiously enough this judgment did not appear to be affected by the failure of the political aims which had led to the Seven Years' War. To-day those very political aims have a peculiar interest by reason of the light they cast upon the age and the persistency of the Prussian dream of empire. " The territorial configuration of what was then the Kingdom of Prussia must have seemed intolerable to a monarch like Frederick the Great, the more so that the Prussian monarchy included some of the most barren districts of Germany. Four years earlier (1752) when Frederick had believed himself to be at the point of death, he had drawn up a political testament for his successor. There were three territories which, according to this last will and testament, the King deemed it desirable to acquire by conquest, namely, the Electorate of Saxony, Polish West Prussia, and Swedish Pomerania ; but of these Frederick regarded Electoral Saxony as by far the most

* " Cambridge Modern History," VI., 300.

important and urgent acquisition, because it would enable its Prussian conqueror to readjust the shapeless formation of his state, besides adding wealth, manufacturing industries and civilisation.”* It is not difficult to discern here the foreshadowing of those dreams of a revised map of Europe which the Prussian mind in our own time has dreamt. And curiously enough, Frederick has left on record a confession of miscalculation in entering upon the Seven Years’ War, which seems singularly anticipatory of more recent happenings. “While Frederick waited with feverish impatience for an opportunity of forcing the Austrians encamped at Zittau to a battle, he composed an *Apology* to be made public in the event of his being struck down. This document, preserved in the Prussian archives, was first printed in 1856. In it the King expresses his bitter repentance that he had ever begun the war. ‘How could I foresee that France would send 150,000 men into the Empire? How could I foresee that the Empire would take part in the struggle, that Sweden would mix herself up in this war, that France would subsidise Russia?’”† Whether in its dreams or in its blunders, Prussianism does not seem to be greatly changed.

But an event had happened previous to the Seven Years’ War which may be regarded as laying the foundation of the Prussian tradition—the acquisition by Frederick of Silesia by the terms of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Silesia has remained in Prussian hands since that day, and modern Germany

† “Cambridge Modern History,” VI., p. 251.

* *Ibid.* 262.

looks back to Frederick's achievement in this matter as a historical turning point. It was the real beginning of the policy which dictated the Seven Years' War, and after the war, of the diligent economic development of Prussia, and ultimately in the succeeding reign, of the acquisition of Prussian Poland, so that "the territorial acquisitions of Prussia between the close of the Seven Years' War and the death of Frederick William II. increased her population from four-and-a-half to nearly seven-and-a-half millions; and the growth of the State in area was relatively even greater."*

We see in these circumstances the early stages in the development of a tradition; our interest in them at the present moment is not the immediate historical bearing they have upon the modern situation, so much as the illustration they afford of the characteristic Prussian zest for territorial aggrandisement. The development which we are now considering received a very shattering check at Jena at the hands of Napoleon, and some have seen in that event the end of the old Prussian tradition. But Napoleon did not destroy it; he merely stunned it for a time. And we have lived to see the revival of the tradition in a most authentic and recognizable form. From Stein to Bismarck was a period of recovery and consolidation; and out of their labours re-emerged at last the old Prussian instinct for empire, the consequences of which the world is groaning under to-day. William II. is Frederick the Great *redivivus*.

It may indeed be seriously asked whether the present German Emperor has not modelled himself to a great

* "Cambridge Modern History," VI., p. 710.

extent upon the pattern of his great predecessor. The encouragement which Frederick the Great consistently gave to the economic development of his own Prussia, and his domestic policy generally find their counterpart in the diligence with which William II. has encouraged and fostered the industrial and commercial advance of his Empire. And just as Frederick the Great will always be remembered for his championship of the Enlightenment, so William II. will be famous for his advocacy of German "culture."* In more than one way the present Kaiser has stood before the world as the patron of learning; and few modern monarchs have displayed so much personal interest in the enterprises of scholarship within the borders of their States. Whether William II. will take rank in history in the same august company as Frederick II. is very open to question. There were certain epic qualities in the greatness of "old Fritz" which do not seem to have reappeared in his successor.

II

What the historical origins of the modern German notion of a culture-mission are it is not easy to say. It is, however, impossible to survey the history of Teutonic achievement in literature and art without recognizing the existence of a very real culture-tradition; and it is possible that reflection upon the past literary and artistic greatness of Germany has superimposed this idea of a culture-mission upon the grosser

* "Frederick's title to be called 'the Great' is more than half due to his having made room in the world for the *Aufklärung*."—
 "Camb. Mod. Hist.," VI., p. 725.

imperial aspirations which seem native to the Prussian mind. It is an incongruous and unnatural mating; and we may perhaps ascribe it to the inevitable fusion of sentiment and national outlook which the consolidation of the German Empire with all the diverse elements that constitute it has set afoot. It was a task of no little difficulty to bring Prussian jingoism and the idea of a culture-mission into any real harmony, and it is perhaps due to the prolific brain of the Kaiser that this unnatural union has been consummated.

That there has been a growingly profound conviction of the supremacy of the Teutonic type of culture in Germany in the last generation is beyond any question. Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain's work, "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," is symptomatic of this development; and while he continually warns us against the identification of Teuton with German, and extends the term Teuton to cover a very wide area, there can be no doubt that the general result of the work has been to accentuate and to confirm in the German people the sense of their peculiar heritage in culture and civilization, and to quicken in them the feeling of their destiny of world-dominion and world-leadership. Mr. Chamberlain himself, while protesting against the identification of Teuton and German, and the exclusive claim of the German to be the direct and only heir of the Teutonic tradition, nevertheless speaks of the "distinct national colour and the richness of the gifts of this people,"* that is, the German people who not unnaturally might be encouraged by such a description to regard themselves as the supreme

* "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," II., p. 231.

standard-bearers of the Teutonic culture. In Mr. Chamberlain's pages, Teutonic culture stands out as so dazzling and marvellous a thing that it is hardly to be wondered at that it has had a somewhat intoxicating effect. He speaks of the Teutons as "those splendid 'barbarians' glowing with youth, free, making their entry into history with all those qualities which fit them for the very highest place,"* as "the true 'free-born of Aristotle,'"† and though since those early days they have misbehaved themselves by weakening their stock through "mixture with the impure races of the 'slave-born,'" their record nevertheless leads Mr. Chamberlain to the judgment that "the Teuton is one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest power in the history of mankind."† Mr. Chamberlain describes the Teutonic achievement in a passage upon which recent events are a most luminous commentary: "The civilization and culture which radiating from Northern Europe to-day dominate (though in very varying degrees) a considerable part of the world are the work of Teutonism; what is not Teutonic consists either of alien elements not yet exorcised, which were formerly forcibly introduced and still like baleful germs circulate in the blood, or of alien wares, sailing to the disadvantage of our work and further development under the Teutonic flag, under Teutonic protection and privilege; and they will continue to sail thus until we send these pirate ships to the bottom. This work of Teutonism is beyond question the greatest that has yet been accomplished by men. It was achieved, not by the delusion of a

* *Ibid.*, I., 575.† *Ibid.*, I., p. 577.

'humanity,' but by sound selfish power; not by belief in authority, but by free investigation; not with contentedness with little, but by insatiable ravenous hunger. As the youngest of races, we Teutons could profit by the achievements of former ones; but this is no proof of a universal progress of humanity, but solely of the pre-eminent capabilities of a definite human species, capabilities which have been proved to have been weakened by the influx of non-Teutonic blood, or even (as in Austria) of anti-Teutonic principles. No one can prove that the predominance of Teutonism is a fortunate thing for all the earth. From the earliest times down to the present day we see the Teutons, to make room for themselves, slaughtering whole tribes and races, or slowly killing them by systematic demoralization. That the Teutons with their virtues alone and without their vices, such as greed, cruelty, treachery, disregard of all rights but their own right to rule, etc., would have won the victory no one will have the audacity to assert, but every one must admit that in the very places where they were most cruel, as for instance, the Anglo-Saxons in England, the German Order in Prussia, the French and English in North America, they laid by this very means the sure foundation of what is highest and most moral."*

Mr. Chamberlain is very faithful in his criticisms of the Teuton; but what strikes one in reading this passage is the vivid light which it sheds upon the whole spirit of German statecraft as it expressed itself in Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg's famous speech on the violation of Belgian neutrality in the Reichstag and

* "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," II., pp. 228 ff.

in the subsequent treatment of Belgium by the German military authorities.

That modern Germany has tended to regard itself as the fairest flower of this peculiar Teutonic culture seems a justifiable conclusion from all the grandiloquence which has characterised the preaching of the culture-mission. We should do Mr. Chamberlain an injustice if we supposed that such exclusive claims were in his view tenable; but it is hardly to be questioned that his teaching has afforded a very considerable stimulus to the traditional "*tête montée*" of the Prussian. Nothing could be more indicative of the self-assurance of the Pan-German mind than the amusingly naive way in which the Kaiser has asserted a monopoly of the favours of God. The explanation of Pan-Germanism has to be sought in historical origins which date long before Nietzsche and Treitschke. We are now-a-days ascribing the aggressiveness of Prussian imperialism to these two thinkers. No doubt they have greatly stimulated it; but the truth is that they are symptoms and products, like itself, of a certain ancient psychological bias in the Prussian mind.

III

What Nietzsche did was to supply a plausible theoretic and rhetorical justification of the Prussian lust of power. Nietzsche can hardly be called a philosopher in the academic sense. He approximated more nearly to the poetic and prophetic mind; and the perversion of his genius to the apotheosis of the "will to power" is one of the great tragedies of culture. This is not the place to examine Nietzsche's

teaching in detail, and it is hardly fair to judge him out of his context. We are probably doing less than justice to him to-day because he is being held up to us as the degenerate protagonist of a gospel of might. His fierce criticism of the prevailing Christian ethic ought yet to be a real contribution to the task of securing a genuine and forthright restatement of the Christian moral obligation. But it is not to be questioned that the moral values which he preached are a complete negation of the Christian ethic. The antithesis which has been enunciated in recent months, "Nietzsche or Christ," is well-founded. At bottom there are two broad types of morality. The one is the morality of self-affirmation, self-development, the will to power; the other is the morality of self-subordination, of self-sacrifice, the will to obey. The former is the burden of Nietzsche, the latter is the Gospel of Jesus. This carries us very much farther back than the Prussian tradition. It takes us to that person who is called in the New Testament "the natural man," and Christianity stands over against the "natural" man in a position of complete and uncompromising antithesis. The "superman" of Nietzsche is simply a glorified version of the "natural man" of the New Testament.

To the person who believes that a co-operative social existence is a condition of perfect human development, who agrees with Huxley that "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process,"* Nietzscheanism is plainly condemned.

* "Evolution and Ethics" (1893), p. 81.

For it is no more than a transcript, into terms of human life, of the "cosmic process," of the ethic of the forest and the jungle. It is the deification of "the ape and tiger" in us. The doctrine of the superman logically and generally accepted can only issue in a scrimmage out of which a few supermen will at last emerge, and the only social order which can be conceived of under these conditions is that of an armed peace among supermen, of tyranny by the few, and "slave-morality" for the rest. The Nietzschean ethic involves a lapse into barbarism and worse. It must necessarily convert the world into a cockpit. It is very well for the disciples of Nietzsche to affirm that he was not preaching to the crowd, that his doctrine is addressed to the strong. But when a man shouts at the street corner he cannot select his audience, and the noise of Nietzsche has gone forth through all the earth. It is useless to hide from ourselves the fact that the practice of the will to power by any man who cares to do so must entail the constant commission of unsocial and anti-social acts. No free society can hold together for a day except upon a basis of common personal self-subordination. Not only is the Nietzschean view opposed to the Christian; it is also opposed to the biological view of society. "From a biological point of view," says Dr. Mercier, "morality is the preponderance of social conduct over self-regarding conduct. . . . By far the greater part of the conduct that is imposed upon us by our membership of an organized community may be summed up in the single word, *renunciation*. To share the advantages of common life in any degree, to taste the sweets of

companionship, to gain the advantage of common action against enemies, of protection in helplessness, of nurture in sickness, of nourishing in poverty and starvation; to enjoy the delights of being approved, admired, applauded, loved; to attain the rarer and more refined satisfaction of rendering services to others, to participate in the luxuries and glories of an advanced civilization,—for all these advantages a price must be paid, and the price is *renunciation*." Nietzsche receives as short shrift from the biologist as he does from the Christian thinker.

There are collateral questions of origin in the teaching of Nietzsche which are full of interest. It has been held that he is the product of a despiritualized and de-christianized Protestantism; and this must at least be considered in any final estimate of the influences which produced him. It is, moreover, an interesting question whether Protestantism was not bound to be despoiled of spirituality under conditions which to a great extent compelled it to march side by side with Prussian jingoism. If the traditional Prussian spirit is one of aggressiveness, then it is clean contrary to the Christianity of the New Testament, and a Protestantism which submitted to its yoke must inevitably be denuded of its Christian elements. Christianity checks a man's individualism without destroying his individuality; Protestantism was the assertion of the place and rights of the individual over against the claims of mediæval ecclesiasticism, and just as a de-christianized Catholicism becomes a dehumanizing tyranny, so a de-christianized Protestantism must inevitably sink at last into a mere

pagan individualism. It seems to have reached that point in Nietzsche.

It is not difficult to see how Nietzsche's teaching would stimulate the spirit and the aims of German patriotism. By a strange paradox, Nietzsche had a profound contempt for the Germanic culture; that, however, has not prevented his mind dominating the minds that have dominated modern Germany. The virtual "slave morality" imposed upon the masses, the military caste's contempt for the civilian, these are true to the Nietzschean type. But German political thought has improved on Nietzsche. It has translated his doctrine of the "superman" into the doctrine of the "supernation." The profound conviction of the coming triumph of Germanic culture has provided the ornaments of the doctrine, and has prevented it appearing before the world in its crude inner paganism; but true to Mr. Houston Chamberlain's reading of the Teutonic temper and character already quoted, the necessary preliminary of the prosecution of the culture-mission is the subjection of the world to the Germanic power. Germany must first of all become mistress of the world, brushing all its rivals aside on the way; and then when once the world is at its feet, it will give it the inestimable advantages of German culture. This irresistibly recalls that word of penetrating irony spoken by Jesus: "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them, and they that have authority over them are called *Benefactors*."*

* Luke xxii. 25.

WHERE HAS GERMANY GONE WRONG ?

IV

It was Treitschke who gave to the Prussian dream an intellectual construction. His name stands out foremost among a group of historians and political thinkers of real eminence as the interpreter of the principles of German history and all that seemed implied in them for the future of the nation. He is spoken of, according to Professor Cramb, as "our great national historian,"* and his work has something like the authority of a sacred scripture for many of his fellow-countrymen. For him as well as for the group of his fellow-labourers in the same cause, "the greatness of Prussia and the fate-appointed world-task and world-mission of Germany under the sacred dynasty of the Hohenzollern,"† was a fundamental and unchanging principle. The spirit which underlay the passionate rhetoric of Nietzsche is translated by Treitschke into the idiom of politics and international relationships; and the result is to be found in Treitschke's definition of the aim of Germany, as Professor Cramb interprets it:—"That just as the greatness of Germany is to be found in the governance of Germany by Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world is to be found in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in a word, of the German character. . . . The triumph of the Empire will be the triumph of German culture, of the German world-vision in all the phases and departments of human life and energy, in religion, poetry, science, art, politics and social endeavour."‡

* Cramb, "England and Germany," p. 71.

† *Ibid.*, p. 74.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

But the prerequisite of the realization of this aim is power. Out of this necessity arose Treitschke's characteristic doctrine of the State which has become an article of faith in modern Germany. "The State," says Treitschke, "is the highest thing in the external society of man; above it there is nothing at all in the history of the world." "There is no room here for the comity of nations, . . . for international law in any true sense."* No supra-national standards or sanctions are acknowledged. The necessity of the State becomes the only law to be recognized. It is not difficult to forecast the sequel of this view of the State. Its first business consists in the acquisition of power; its policies must be shaped in the interests of "the public might for defence and offence." "To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the State." To this idea is to be traced that assiduous cultivation of the domestic life of Germany which was sketched in the first chapter,—and this is the solitary result of the doctrine which can be regarded as in any degree good. The two most disastrous implications of the doctrine are, first its virtual repudiation of the validity of treaties and international agreements, save only as they do not conflict with necessities of State, and second, the glorification of war.

The last few weeks have revealed to us how thoroughly Germany had prepared for war; and this is not to be wondered at when we recall the kind of sanctity which Treitschke has ascribed to war. War, he tells us, is to be conceived as an ordinance of God. And again :

* "Why we are at War" (Oxford, 1914), p. 109. For a clear and concise study of the modern German theory of the State and its *sequela* the reader may be referred to Ch. V. of this book.

"It is political idealism that demands war." We have heard a good deal from time to time, from sources other than German, of the tonic qualities of war; but it has been left to Treitschke to exalt it into a sacred obligation.

But even more disastrous than this praise of war is the effect of the German doctrine of the State upon international relationships. On this view no nation need keep its covenants with other nations longer than it suits it to do so. That such a position makes the hope of international peace an absurdity is not an objection to which the Pan-German doctors would pay serious respect. They regard peace with contempt as a relaxing and devitalising condition; and ideas of international comity they dismiss as contrary to the true conception of the State. The State must from its nature be essentially exclusive, and it must hold no traffic with other States which might conceivably conflict with its own self-interest. If it does enter on any covenants or treaties it holds itself at liberty to depart from them when and where it will. When it is argued that this attitude removes all the safeguards of the integrity of weaker communities, the answer is returned that the integrity of weaker communities is a negligible advantage in comparison to their inclusion in the elevating embrace of German culture.

We have seen how far the plea of State necessity may go in these recent weeks. The violation of Belgian neutrality was on the German view right, because it was necessary to Germany. Belgium had, presumably, no rights, for the simple reason that it was weaker than Germany. It is to this inexorable doctrine

that Louvain and Rheims Cathedral have been sacrificed. The necessities of Pan-Germanism which overrides the rights of little peoples are not likely to respect the triumphs of human effort and art in the past. The calculated terrorism by which the districts in the wake of the German progress have been paralysed is frankly and openly justified on the same grounds. It is difficult to characterize adequately a doctrine which has such sequels as these. "By their fruits shall ye know them." Upon any criterion of fair dealing such as exists in any decent society, the characteristic Pan-German doctrine of the State stands for ever condemned.

CHAPTER III

PERSONALITY AND NATIONALITY

It is clear that the regulative idea of the political philosophy of Pan-Germanism is the supremacy of the State. This is the fixed point from which all its political thinking starts. It is the preliminary acceptance upon which is based the whole structure of modern German sociology and international economy. It is difficult for us to realize how firmly entrenched this conception is in the Prussian mind. Some of the statements made concerning the State amount to something like an apotheosis of it. The supremacy and the sanctity of the State is to be the absolute guiding principle of all conduct, whether of the individual or the community. The State is the sacred God-given treasure, to the cultivation and defence of which all personal interests are subordinate, and in the interests of which no international covenants need be regarded as inviolable.

From this it follows that the necessity of the State becomes the only recognized moral standard. The Decalogue must bow to it ; its one canon of right is its own self-preservation and reinforcement. Other rights, whether personal or national, must be disregarded if they stand in the way of its true aim. From such a claim as this it is only a short step to the next—the arrogation of “divine rights,” and the doctrine of the

one chosen people. Most civilized nations have grown beyond this infantile stage ; the Prussian mind is still plainly in swaddling clothes.

Let us consider for a moment the consequences of this doctrine. Naturally it involves a view of the individual merely as the tool of the State. He has no significance except as an economic or fighting unit. His value is just the measure of the power which he contributes to the State. It is therefore the business of the State so to care for him that he will contribute the very maximum of his possible power to the whole ; and therefore the State will see to it that he is properly housed and fed and educated and drilled. But the State will also see that his power of causing trouble to itself is adequately restricted. His liberties will be curtailed. His individuality will be flattened out of him. The opportunity of initiative and independent action will be reduced to a minimum. If the process be carried on long enough the individual will come to accept this position of virtual servitude without any serious challenge ; and the nation will become at last a well-oiled, easy-running, producing and fighting machine. That this is no caricature of the consequences of the Prussian doctrine of the State, is demonstrated by Professor Cramb's summary of "Treitschke's governing idea,"—"the glory of an army which is a nation, and of a nation which is an army." And since the end of the State is expressed in terms of power, the military caste assumes an ascendancy to which the mere civilian herd is contemptible.

It is unnecessary in view of the treatment of Belgium to indicate in detail the nature of the second main

consequence of the Prussian doctrine of the State. The violation of a little people on the sole ground of the exigencies of a more powerful State indicates a contempt for the principle of nationality as disastrous as that contempt for personality which has followed from the Prussian doctrine in its application to domestic affairs. It is on this ground that the most destructive criticism of the Pan-German view of the State will be made from the standpoint of the political philosopher—that it entails a disregard of the two sacred principles of personality and nationality.

This is surely the inevitable result of converting into an end what is plainly only a means. The State is the organ of the national life and not its lord. It is there to serve the nation, and not to tyrannize over it. It is the nation organized for the purposes of its domestic affairs and its foreign relations. It is the mouthpiece of the commonwealth. Its function is to do the will of the nation, and not to impose its own will upon the nation, to express the mind of the people and not to force its own mind upon the people. That at least is the democratic view, the British view; and what we are confronted with is the irreconcilable conflict of two principles of government, the democratic and the oligarchic. Nietzsche has told us that mankind falls into two broad classes of master and slave; and though he recognizes a considerable hierarchy of grades in society, he sees nevertheless at the one end the ruling class and at the other “the class of man who thrives best when he is looked after and closely observed, the man who is happy to serve, not because he must, but because he is what he is, the man uncorrupted by

political and religious lies concerning liberty, equality and fraternity,—who is half-conscious of the abyss which separates him from his superiors, and who is happiest when performing those acts which are not beyond his limitations.”* We have already seen that Nietzsche is more a symptom than a cause of the Prussian type of mind ; but in any case this passage is a fairly accurate transcript of the Prussian mind. Its ideal is a nation of industrial and military conscripts commanded by a small junta of strong men who arrogate to themselves the title of the State. “ *L'état, c'est nous*,” we Prussian oligarchs. And out of this arises that contempt for personality which is at last destructive of national vitality, and that contempt for nationality which is at last destructive of national honour and uprightness. From all of which it follows that there can be no real culture of personality and no real brotherhood of nations, except through a process of universal democratisation.

I

Mr. Nevinson in his excellent little work on “ The Growth of Freedom,” says that “ the insistence upon the incalculable value of every human being was the great service of Christianity to the history of freedom.” It was the deliberate judgment of Jesus that no temporal or material advantage is equivalent in value to that which makes us men. “ What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his life ”—not his physical life, but his ψυχή, his immaterial substance, himself ? The immeasurable value of the individual

* A. M. Ludovici, “ Nietzsche,” pp. 85 ff.

soul is central to the mind of Jesus, and it is one of the permanent elements of the inheritance which the modern world has received from Him. Here is the opposite pole to the Nietzschean position. In anti-thesis to his glorification of the strong, Christianity asserts the infinite and therefore equal value of all human souls. On the Christian view the first function of the State is to order the life of the nation so that every single soul shall have the opportunity of perfect self-expression and perfect self-development. The sacredness of personality, its right to such development as it is capable of, this is the real "fixed point" from which political thought upon domestic affairs must start. Christ's estimate of the worth of the individual is the only possible corner-stone for a sound conception of the State, the first principle of a stable social order.

From this point of view it is axiomatic that human personality must have room and opportunity for its highest possible development. No man is born without a range of incalculable potentialities; and he has an inherent right to such conditions as may enable him to realize these possibilities. This does not mean that we are to endeavour to establish a dead level of equality. That is not possible. That every soul is of equal worth does not mean that every soul is equally endowed; but it does mean that every soul has a right to make the best of the endowment which it has. The processes of education will sort men out and distribute them to their own proper places in the commonwealth. But every man has a right to such conditions as may enable him to make the best of himself.

It is not Pan-Germanism only that has failed to pay

due regard to this fundamental principle of social order. The great defect of the economic doctrines which have determined our social conditions in the past has been their refusal to treat men as men. The economists have been too prone to treat men as mere pawns in their calculations. It is true that a very great revolution has come over economic thought during the last generation ; and men are not treated as so many lay figures to be handled at will by speculative thinkers, but beings compact of " loves, hopes, longings," of feeling, reason and will. But while in theory we have made real advance, in practice we are still laggard. Ruskin lamented years ago that while here in England we made pretty well everything under the sun, we were failing to make men. The reproach has not passed away from us. Our industrial system is not yet ordered on the basis of respect for personality ; and we have still with us the humiliating circumstance that there are men and women in our land whose only chance of preserving their physical life (not to speak of a wholesome and full development of their personal possibilities) is through submitting to dehumanizing and cramping conditions. Overcrowding, the disorder of the labour market, the incoherency of our educational system, sweating and other industrial evils,—all these things show how far we have yet to travel before we have reconstructed our social order on the principle of respect for personality. We have not arrived at that stage of Christian civilization in which we shall regard any condition of life which hurts a human soul as a hateful and odious thing, a thing to be ended or mended with speed.

Yet let it be observed that our jealousy for our personal liberties has had not a little to do with the tardiness of the improvement in social conditions. Social reform has been easier in Germany because it had not to encounter the suspicion of a free but badly educated people. In our bones is the strong feeling that we do not want to be interfered with ; and we are constantly raising outcries against " grandmotherly legislation." The independence of our British poor has been one of the great hindrances to domestic reform. At the same time we have to acknowledge the steady growth of a spirit among us which demands that the State shall save the weak from hurtful exploitation at the hands of the strong. Since Robert Owen's great campaign a century ago for the betterment of the conditions of child labour in factories, we have seen the coming, slow but sure, of a new respect for the personality of the weakest in the nation. It has expressed itself in Truck Acts, Factory Acts, Compensation Acts, Education Acts, Insurance Acts, and the like ; and we seem to be gradually moving towards the necessary balance between the rights and the limitations of the individual, which is the secret of liberty *for all*.

The difference between England and Germany in this matter is simply that such disregard for the rights of personality as we have seen in the life of the former are incidental and remediable, while in the policy which has determined the domestic life of the latter, disregard for personality is inevitable and incurable. The State, as the German doctrine conceives it, involves depressed and truncated personality, and for that reason it contains the seeds of dissolution in itself. For soon or

late personality asserts itself and demands its rights. This is the dynamic of all great social and political upheavals. The French Revolution was the consequence of an oppressed human nature finding itself, realizing its power, and bursting its chains ; and all the great historical struggles for liberty have sprung from the demand of personality for emancipation from cramping and impoverishing conditions. The heritage of personality is liberty, room to grow, room to express itself ; and any system which denies it this room is predestined to bankruptcy and destruction.

But it is plain that utterly unlimited freedom of self-expression must destroy social order and lead to anarchy. The principle of respect for personality, however, carries its own safeguard within itself. While it is my respect for my own personality which makes me claim my liberties, yet in the very act of claiming them I concede an equal right to my neighbour. And since I and my neighbour must in the nature of things live together, we must agree to respect each other's liberties. We come, if we are reasonably disposed people, to a mutual agreement as to our frontiers, and we undertake not to violate them. Therein is the germ of a real social order,—the willing acceptance of those limitations which are prescribed by regard for my neighbour's right and welfare. But in a social order, it is not an affair merely of one neighbour, but of all my neighbours ; and neighbourly relations have to be stated in terms of the whole, to be systematized and regulated by the will of the whole. This is the essence of democracy,—the delegation to a supra-personal authority of the business of adjusting and regulating

the entire range of social relationships within the community. This is what is called "government by consent," and it necessarily contains that willing acceptance of the restrictions prescribed by the will of the whole. In every community there will be those who refuse to submit to the will of the whole ; and in the interests of the whole they must be constrained to submission. If they do not accept limitations willingly, then they must accept them under compulsion. On no other terms can a social order be held together in the world as it is to-day. The only other alternative is anarchy. Democracy becomes unworkable unless those who refuse to accept the limitations defined by the general will are rare exceptions. Only under such conditions is it possible to effect that synthesis of liberty and order which is the ultimate problem of all government.

It is plain, therefore, that a healthy and strong democracy postulates the existence of a certain moral elevation in the mass of those who constitute it. It demands a great faith in human nature ; and it demands that human nature shall become worthy of faith. We sometimes say that the British constitution rests upon trust in the people ; that simply means that the people trust themselves and each other. Real trust presupposes trustworthiness. And the measure of the stability of a democracy is the measure in which it rests upon the twin potencies of trustfulness and trustworthiness. These are the only terms upon which a people can be free ; the only other possible social order is that in which the individual is hedged in on every side by prohibitions and restraints and is denied that

spaciousness in which he can make the most of his own individual endowments. Only a democratic form of government can give personality its native rights. That the world has not yet seen a democracy in being in which the requisite conditions of full personal self-development have been wholly achieved is due to our common human heritage of frailty. Nowhere has mankind yet attained to that plane of moral elevation on which the perfect democracy is possible. But democracy is as yet very young,—hardly out of its swaddling clothes. Nevertheless even in its present imperfection it possesses the rare promise of a day when it will afford to every man the opportunity to realise his entire inheritance of spiritual and moral endowment.

II

The fixed point in the domestic policies of a community must, therefore, be respect for personality; but it is plain that respect for personality entails also a respect for those natural social groupings in and through which personality has to realize itself. The first and most obvious of these groups is the family; and the family is the true unit of the State. It becomes the care of the State therefore to safeguard the conditions of wholesome family life. It will charge itself with the duty of seeing that the family is properly housed, that the moral sanctions of family life are jealously upheld; and it will only reluctantly consent to any alterations of law and custom which tend to loosen the family bond. Nor will it impose upon individuals obligations towards itself which conflict directly with the natural obligations to one's family. One peril of such an

exaltation of the State as we have seen in the Prussian doctrine is that it tends increasingly to encroach upon the privacies of the home and the sanctities of the family relationship. The strength of the family rests largely upon the preservation of the private and exclusive intimacies of the home circle ; and when the door of the home is not in the power of the head of the house, the charm which is the strength of domesticity disappears. At the same time it is not unnecessary that we should remember that families develop a type of corporate selfishness which militates seriously against the well-being of the commonwealth ; and many existing laws of inheritance are the products of aristocratic family exclusiveness and are injurious to the general good. A good family tradition is a worthy inheritance ; but it may easily degenerate into a tradition of a little *imperium in imperio*, as it has frequently done in the case of the landed aristocracy in many lands. The law which operates in the case of the individual operates also in the case of the family. Just as the individual is free within the limits imposed by the welfare of the whole, so the sanctities of the family must remain inviolate until such a point is reached that its exclusiveness and self-service becomes a menace to the life of the community.

But for our present purposes the most important of these groupings is the nation ; and this supplies us with the second regulative principle for political philosophy, —namely, the principle of nationality. The modern German doctrine of the State entails a real contempt for nationality just as it does for personality. It refuses to acknowledge the rights of nationality when these

become inconvenient or obstructive to its purposes. The high-handed treatment of Belgium in this present war shows that in a political system where right is defined as the necessity of the State, the rights of a weaker nation are held lightly. Nor can the invasion of Belgium be justified on the ground that it was a sudden and unexpected exigency. Bernhardi had already found reasons for disregarding Belgian neutrality, and though the violation of Belgium has been defended on the score of its necessity to the purposes of the German military programme in this war, it seems pretty clear that it was not an unforeseen contingency. The German Chancellor has acknowledged that it was a wrong, but that only proves that the German mind is dominated by its doctrine of the State even to the exclusion of universal moral principles. A law-abiding people's country should be as inviolable as a law-abiding man's home, and no necessity of State should be allowed to over-ride so plain and obvious a natural right.

But the German contempt for the principle of nationality finds a theoretical justification in the very ideal of Pan-Germanism. Just as Germany was Prussianized, so the world was to be Germanized. The Teuton stamp was to be impressed upon the human race,—this was the whole meaning of the culture-mission. The world was to be recast in a Teutonic mould. So far as the experiment has been tried, it has hitherto proved a failure. That failure is written large and deep over German colonies. It has been a stupid and fatuous blunder to suppose that the civil and military discipline of Berlin could be transported to any piece of unreclaimed territory. There is not a

little truth in the jest that when an Englishman colonizes, the first thing he does is to lay out a cricket pitch and to build a church, whereas the German lays out a parade ground. The former tries to found a society ; the latter endeavours to create a State. It indicates a singularly ill-founded judgment upon human nature to imagine that a way of life can be imposed upon it in a tropical wilderness which may be excellent in a city in the temperate zone, but which has no relation to the actual conditions upon the spot. German methods of colonization recall the bed of Procrustes. There are prosperous German colonies in the world, but they are not under the German flag.

The one thing that human nature is not fashioned for is uniformity. Indeed, nowhere is uniformity a mark of life. George Tyrrell, in one of his greatest passages, describes Catholicism as he conceives it (and how different the conception is from the reality!). It must, he says, "betray the same sort of irregularities as the other co-factors of civilization, as language or social custom, or traditional political institutions. It requires two principles for its development : one a principle of wild luxuriance, of spontaneous expansion and variation in every direction ; the other a principle of order, restraint, and unification in conflict with the former, often overwhelmed by its task, always more or less in arrears. The tangle and undergrowth of the forest is always more than the woodman can cope with.

. . . Thus its very wildnesses and barbarisms point to the natural character of Catholicism and distinguish it from all planned-out philosophical religions whose over-trimness is an indication of their poverty and

exhaustion ; for nothing that lives and grows can keep its shape for long."* Tyrrell is describing something larger than and different from the Catholicism we know ; it is what some people call the Kingdom of God, that Divine order of life in which upon a ground of unity there is ceaseless variation and endless diversity. Life does not conform to legislation. It is for ever outgrowing and outstripping it. Nor is it sufficiently recognized that what we call the social problem is to a great extent the effort to readjust material conditions to fit the ever-enlarging frontiers of life. While human nature is a living and growing thing, so long will there be a social problem ; for the social order of to-day will not contain the life of to-morrow. And the readjustment will always leave some litter about. But we may learn at least this from Tyrrell's account of Catholicism—that it is hopeless to expect life to conform to a single type, and that the attempt to impose a single character, however admirable, upon a living race is bound to end in failure. The only known place where uniformity reigns in this world is the grave. A Germanized world would be a dead world.

The world is already, so Lord Bryce tells us, too uniform, and is becoming more uniform every day. The improvement in means of communication and the consequent increase in travelling facilities, undoubtedly makes for a certain interfusion of national characters and a resulting loss in variety. Nevertheless it is impossible to conceive of this process going beyond a certain point. The broad human distinctions seem permanent. For, though it is too much to say that

* "Through Scylla and Charybdis," p. 24.

East and West can never meet, it is impossible to think of a time when East is not still East, and West does not remain West. Nor is it desirable that West and East should so intermingle as to lose their identity. Biologically it would appear dangerous at this stage for such an intermingling of widely separate types to take place. Neither type under such conditions is likely to achieve the best kind of development ; and from the standpoint of culture it is necessary that East and West should each labour for the perfection of its own peculiar genius. Each has much to give to the other ; and the passing of the distinction between them will greatly hinder this process of mutual enrichment. Mr. Rabindranath Tagore has contrasted the city-born civilization of the West with the forest-born civilization of India, and indicates the corresponding difference in the attitude of the two to nature, the one being that of the desire of conquest over nature, the other of the search for harmony with nature.* Who doubts that, as they stand, East and West have only divined a part of the truth, and that they have neither yet realized the fulness of the truth which they have discerned ? And who doubts that both will have to bring in their own inheritance and gain of truth into the common stock before the truth will stand complete ?

It is indeed a commonplace of our thinking that in the divine providence nations have been appointed to make each its own peculiar contribution to the wealth of life. Mr. Houston Chamberlain, that enthusiastic Pan-Teuton, has himself gone to no little trouble to show how the Greek and Roman have each made the

* *Sadhana*, "The Realization of Life," Ch. I.

modern world its debtor, and though he is somewhat grudging in his admissions concerning the Jewish contribution, he cannot escape the conclusion that the world is debtor also to the Jew. As for the Jew, happily we have the best authority for his mission in the plan of the ages. There was One who said that "Salvation is of the Jews," which must be interpreted as meaning that the Jew was in the main stream of the progress of revelation; and it must be frankly admitted by those who are not affected by anti-semitic bias, that the Jews were the instruments of that religious progress which prepared the world for the revelation of God in Christ. Through their long and manifold discipline they discerned here a little and there a little of the Word of God until it became possible at last for the Word to become flesh and to dwell among us. And just as the history of the Jews is for the man who studies it understandingly, a great quarry of sound political philosophy, so the doctrine of the "chosen people" becomes a real parable for all peoples. The Jews were not the only "chosen people," nor were they the first. But they were the people in whom this principle of national vocation was revealed to the world in a concrete and unmistakable form. Nor for their special purposes were the Greeks and the Romans less "chosen peoples." They not only afforded the proper intellectual setting and the external facilities for the Christian witness, but they have left the world a splendid and unrequitable heritage, the one of philosophy and art, the other of law and political method. It would be a denial of what appears to be one of the best-founded lessons of history to suppose that even yet national

distinctions have become negligible or that the divine principle of national vocation has become obsolete.

Of course it has to be admitted that nationality is not a static thing. National characters are frequently modified by miscegenation and other conditions, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse. It is also true that there is no such thing as national immortality. Nations have perished, and the marks of nationality, such as language and social custom, have disappeared. But in cases of unfavourable modification or of total extinction, there may usually be discovered conditions of internal weakness or degeneracy, moral and physical. It is, however, probably demonstrable that no attempt to destroy nationality by force has ever been successful. Coercion of any sort only tends to strengthen national feeling and to confirm national loyalties. The present writer remembers being punished for speaking Welsh in school hours. This was probably the belated survival of an ill-starred policy of extinguishing Welsh nationality,—possibly of the Act of Union in 1535, which declared that “the Union was to mean the abolition of Welsh customs and laws, and the extirpation of the Welsh language.”* It was enacted that “all oaths were to be administered in English;” and that “henceforth no person or persons that use the Welsh speech or languages shall have or enjoy any manner of office or fees within this realm of England, Wales, or other the King’s dominion, upon pain of forfeiting the same office or fees, unless he or they use and exercise the English speech or language.”†

* O. M. Edwards, *Wales*, p. 311 (“Story of the Nations”).

† *Ibid.*, p. 336.

It is no wonder that the Welsh language and Welsh nationality survived; and there are other recent instances of the same tendency. External pressure is powerless to extinguish the principle of nationality. When Bernhardi says that "weak nations have not the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nations,"* he is making too much of mere size, and is forgetting that the aggression of the so-called powerful and vigorous nations becomes the most powerful stimulus of national vitality. The invasion of Belgium has done more for Belgian nationality than any single circumstance in its previous history.

It is of the utmost importance for clear political thinking that it should be remembered that the nations which Bernhardi judges weak by his standards have played a part in the development of the race wholly out of proportion to their size. "The small states, whose absorption is now threatened, have been potent and useful, perhaps the most potent and useful factors in the advance of civilization. It is in them and by them that most of what is most precious in religion, in philosophy, in science and in art has been produced. The first great thoughts that brought man into a true relation with God came from a tiny people inhabiting a country smaller than Denmark. The religions of mighty Babylon and populous Egypt have vanished; the religion of Israel remains in its earlier as well as in that later form which has overspread the world."† Greece, with its small scattered communities, Italy with its small republics, Switzerland, Holland—these too

* "Germany and the Next War," p. 34.

† Viscount Bryce, "Neutral Nations and the War," pp. 7 f.

would fall into Bernhardi's contemptuous category of "weak nations." Yet what wealth of literature, art and moral stimulus have they not imparted to the world? "The small Scandinavian nations have given to the world famous men of science, from Linnæus downwards, poets like Tegner and Bjørnsen, scholars like Madvig, dauntless explorers like Fridtjof Nansen. England had, in the age of Shakespeare, Bacon, and Milton, a population little larger than that of Bulgaria to-day."* It might with advantage be reflected upon by the apostles of the culture-mission, that "in the two most brilliant generations of German literature and thought, the age of Kant and Lessing and Goethe, of Hegel and Beethoven and Schiller and Fichte, there was no real German state at all, but a congeries of principalities and free cities, independent centres of intellectual life, in which letters and science produced a richer crop than the two succeeding generations have raised, just as Britain also, with eight times the population of the year 1600, has had no more Shakespeares or Miltons."†

National diversities make for the enrichment of the race, and it is part of an enlightened world-policy to preserve them. But it may be asked whether this view is consistent with the Christian idea of unity in Christ. In Christ we are told that there is neither Jew nor Greek neither Barbarian nor Scythian,—we are all "one man in Christ Jesus." He is declared to have broken down the wall of partition, and made of the twain—Jew and Gentile—one new man. • But St. Paul was much too

* Viscount Bryce, "Neutral Nations and the War," p. 10.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 10 ff.

far-sighted to ignore the elements of divine ordinance in nationality. It was he who maintained that though God had "made of one all nations of men," yet He had determined for them "their appointed seasons and the bounds of their habitations," which can only be understood as an acknowledgment of the physical conditions which do to a great extent determine national distinctions. The New Testament makes no attempt to ignore nationality; and the world-unity in Christ which the Christian scriptures contemplate is no flat unbroken uniformity, but a world-commonwealth of rich diversity unified by a common acknowledgment of and a common life in Christ.

Contempt of the principle of nationality flies in the face of history and experience; and there can be no sound political thinking upon international relationships which does not accept the integrity of nations, whether great or small, as axiomatic and regulative. It would appear that as within the commonwealth, the moral conditions required by the acknowledgment of the rights of personality are necessary to its health and wealth, so in the larger arena of international relations, the peace and the enrichment of the world are contingent on the preservation of the moral conditions dictated by the rights of nations. Against the view maintained by the Prussian school that the State is the sole judge of the morality of its own action, and is therefore beyond morality, we must insist that the relations of nations to one another must be determined by a supra-national code of moral principles. When Bernhardi asserts that "any action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State

and nationality is impossible,"* he is simply inviting abrupt and unqualified contradiction. The State or nation which ignores collective humanity and shuts itself in to an exclusive self-culture, is suffocating itself. Just as a true conception of the rights of personality contains an acknowledgment of the necessity of certain limitations in the interests of the community, so a true conception of nationality, containing as it does an acknowledgment of the rights of other nationalities, requires the acceptance of certain limitations in the interests of humanity.

Nations will never be able to make the best of themselves until they are immune from the danger of violation. International goodwill is a prerequisite of a true and continuous national development. But international goodwill demands a certain moral elevation in the nations concerned. Where there is reasonable ground for mutual fear or suspicion, there are real perils which are hardly to be averted by the most solemn treaties. Nations must needs learn to trust each other, and must needs therefore prove themselves worthy of trust. The greatest tragedy that has befallen the cause of genuine civilization for many a long day is the utter abandonment of faithfulness to covenants which Germany has permitted itself to be guilty of in respect of Belgium and Luxembourg. The cynical description of a pledged word as a bit of paper which the German Chancellor allowed himself to make, and against which no considerable German protest has yet been heard, has cast a cloud upon German integrity and trustworthiness which will not easily

* "Germany and the Next War," p. 25.

be dissipated ; and this moral land-slide is the natural and inevitable corollary of the Prussian doctrine of the State.

But it would be unfair to say that there have been no other contributory causes to the present distress of Europe than the immorality of the Prussian doctrine of the State. The tradition of secret diplomacy is one of the main causes of international fear and distrust. That it is a denial of the democratic principle it is not necessary to argue. It is mere oligarchy or even autocracy in one of the most important departments of national life. By it whole nations may be committed in ignorance by an individual, or a small group of individuals, to courses which they may not endorse ; and the tradition is only a survival of the aristocratic contempt and distrust of the people. It will be one of our primary concerns in the future to see to it that this tradition is speedily ended, and that our nation shall not henceforth be committed to engagements or alliances of any sort, save only after due discussion and decision in Parliament. Meantime we must attribute much past evil to this way of conducting international affairs. Secrecy is inevitably bound to breed suspicion ; and in international affairs all the cards should be on the table. Otherwise how is public opinion to be informed ? How is one nation to know exactly the attitude of other nations to it ? It is intolerable that the mutual relations of States and nations should be exclusively handled out of sight by a comparatively small group of professional diplomatists—whose very professionalism tends to cramp and to bias their judgments and to steep them in prejudice.

That this has gone on so long is the fault of the people. Sir J. R. Seeley quotes Macaulay as saying that the subject of India "is to most readers not only insipid but positively distasteful." Political indifference is a besetting peril of democracies; and the indifference is aggravated as political problems recede from the centre. The insipidity and distastefulness of Indian problems extends to foreign policy; and one of the most imperative needs of the British democracy is an intelligent acquaintance with the extra-domestic concerns of the State. The foundations of this interest must be laid in the teaching of history, and it is, or ought to be, no more than a commonplace that history should be so taught as to prepare British men and women to enter understandingly into the immediate living issues involved in international relationships. Meantime it is one of those consummations that are devoutly to be wished, that the present situation may quicken in the British people a new interest in international affairs that will deliver them from the dangerous policy of secrecy and compel them to be transacted in the face of the public. It is said of the New Jerusalem that the street thereof is of pure gold "as it were transparent glass." The street is the clearing-house of the city's common life; and the symbolism of the Apocalypse suggests the openness and the publicity of its affairs. The concerns of cities and nations are never wholesome, save only when their entire life is conducted in open daylight.

CHAPTER IV

EMPIRE AND ETHICS

It is not for a moment to be supposed that, because we have endeavoured to expose Prussianism in its true colours, both in respect of its origin and of its consequence, we think that Prussia or the German Empire has a monopoly of it. On the contrary, its roots are as wide as the race; and the difference between Prussia and other countries in this respect is a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind. Prussia has pushed nearer to its logical conclusion than other modern nations a spirit which in varying measure infects them all. We do not indeed need to look farther back than the period immediately succeeding the Boer War to discover in England a spirit not without close analogy to the Prussian temper exposed in these latter days. The spirit of moral self-complacency is peculiarly apt to seize upon the national consciousness, and it is not well that we should allow ourselves to forget that there are not a few passages in English history which still make decent men blush. They who think they stand should take heed lest they fall. The Prussian doctrine that whatever the State does is right has happily not prevailed in this country; that much we have been spared. But we have not been free from the essential materialism of the Prussian

idea, and that has on more than one occasion led to actions and policies which are not to be justified by honest men.

Sir James Seeley has shown the extent to which ideas of commercial expansion stimulated the growth of the British Empire ;* and the story which he tells is not one which serves to reassure us of the moral elevation of many of our forefathers. Sir James Seeley himself does not at all hesitate to call things by their proper names, and to attach the appropriate adjectives to many of our imperial adventures. "A policy now begins which is not to be sure very scrupulous, but is able, resolute and successful." "Moral rectitude is hardly a characteristic feature" of the Cromwellian colonial policy. It is well that we should not leave ourselves under any illusion concerning the origins of the Empire. There was no idealism about it. Indeed, the earlier colonial enterprises which may be justly said to have originated in various forms of idealism, such as the New England Colonies, were ultimately lost to us, and the territories which remain to us were appropriated by reason of what our ancestors hoped to make out of them. It is true that on this view the British Empire is in a sense a bye-product. Our forefathers did not go out specially to build an Empire ; they went out to make wealth and gathered an Empire, as it were, by the way. There is much to be said for the statement that "the British Empire happened."†

* "The Expansion of England," Ch. VI.

† An interesting outside view is expressed in a sentence in Dr Usher's *Pan-Germanism*, p. 252 : "England certainly never took possession of her dependencies by actual conquest, nor does she retain possession by means of physical force."

It was not a deliberately worked-out enterprise of territorial expansion. It was an incident in commercial expansion. In any case, we have to accept Sir John Seeley's view that many passages in the development of Greater Britain will not bear moral scrutiny. There is, for instance, our complicity in the slave trade,—a complicity so profound and deliberate that Lecky described it as established by the Treaty of Utrecht into "a central object of English policy."* Hakluyt tells the story of how it began in 1567; John Hawkins, in the time of Elizabeth, began the English participation in it; during the seventeenth century our share in it grew gradually until we outdid all other nations, both in the extent and the cruelty of our conduct of the infamous traffic. But this very subject serves to suggest one of the extraordinary paradoxes of English history,—perhaps the most extraordinary. If England became foremost in the traffic in slaves, she was first in reparation also. This is not to say that the moral enormity of the slave-traffic was wiped out; the stain still remains on our annals; but it was England that led the way at last, when once the horror of the trade was seen, in the business of slave emancipation. And something like this is to be found throughout our colonial and imperial history. Territories which we had acquired in the spirit of gain, we came at last to administer and to guide with a sense of moral responsibility. Upon this whole matter Sir James Seeley's statement seems entirely fair: "The territory of Greater Britain was acquired in the full light of history and in part by unjustifiable means, but less unrighteously

* "History of England in the Eighteenth Century," II., p. 13.

than the territory of many other powers, and perhaps far less unrighteously than the territory of those States whose power is now most ancient and established. If we compare it with other Empires in respect of its origin, we shall see that it has arisen in the same way ; that its founders have had the same motives and these not mainly noble ; that they have displayed much fierce covetousness, mixed with heroism ; that they have not been much troubled by moral scruples, at least in their dealings with enemies and rivals, though they have often displayed virtuous self-denial in their dealings among themselves. So far we shall find Great Britain to be like other empires, and like other States of whose origin we have any knowledge ; but its annals are on the whole better, not worse than those of most. They are conspicuously better than those of Greater Spain, which are infinitely more stained with cruelty and rapacity. In some pages of these annals there is a real elevation of thought and an intention of at least righteous dealing, which are not often met with in the history of colonization. Some of these founders remind us of Abraham and Æneas. The crimes on the other hand are such as have been almost universal in colonization.”*

I

When we have made all the necessary admissions relative to the unethical character of many passages in our imperial history, we are confronted by the actual fact of the British Empire as it is to-day. It is, as it stands, a unique historical phenomenon. There

* “The Expansion of England,” p. 157.

was never anything like it. It is spread abroad over the world in a vast disorderly mass, without geographical contiguity; yet it possesses, despite its scattered character, a singular and profound energy of cohesion. It is not held together by military force; its component parts are not subject to a common centralized discipline. In the main, it is a sisterhood of free self-governing commonwealths. Nor can it be said that its chief bond is that of the blood-tie. The racial link was not enough to preserve the North American colonies to the British Empire; and there is a certain independence in the British character which does not regard the ties of blood as sacrosanct when other more precious heritages are jeopardized or violated. It is farther to be observed that the British Empire contains large elements of non-British origin, and it is plain that if we are to explain the unity of the Empire we have to search for its causes elsewhere. There is seemingly no question that there were those who believed that the British Empire would be disintegrated whenever the United Kingdom became involved in a European war. It is probable that the Pan-Germanic mind, which had no conception of a colonial empire not held together by military force, failed to recognize the true foundations of British imperial unity and that it miscalculated accordingly. So far from breaking up the Empire, the present war has revealed how deep-laid and solid its foundations are. From the ends of the earth, the Empire is sending her sons to the defence of the mother country in the hour of her peril. It is a magnificent and inspiring spectacle. Spontaneously, generously, the commonwealths of the

Empire are pouring out their wealth, in men, in money, and in kind, to succour the homeland in its distress.

As these lines are being written, the news arrives of the one cloud which has come over the unity of Greater Britain. A certain, probably small, proportion of the Dutch population in South Africa has remained unreconciled to British rule. This is not surprising. It is hardly more than a dozen years since the end of the Boer war ; and it would not be in the least astonishing to discover that these intervening years had failed to extinguish all the bitterness and the animosity of the war. But it is at least significant that even within this short space of time the bulk of the Boer people should have become faithful and loyal citizens of the Empire. This is all the more significant when it is remembered that the circumstances which led up to the Boer War are held by a multitude of people at home not to reflect credit upon British honour. There was at the time of the war a very sharp and bitter division of opinion upon it within the United Kingdom ; and that circumstance is in itself sufficient to show that the survival of some disaffection in South Africa may not be without excuse. The wonder is that after so short an interval there should seemingly be so little. It is probable that had the existing conditions been allowed to remain undisturbed for a generation every trace of hostility to the British connection would have disappeared.

The outstanding fact in South Africa since the war has been the grant of self-government, and it is in this circumstance that we are, I think, to find the key of

the British colonial policy and of the unity of the Empire. That for a moment it appears to have failed partially in South Africa does not affect the general statement that in it is to be found the ground of imperial unity. The grant of self-government is, of course, in itself only a part of the process of imperial consolidation. Even much more important is the less easily definable spirit and temper which underlies it. It involves the conception of equal rights of citizenship through the Empire, irrespective of race ; it makes the stranger free of the children's home. But most of all it rests upon the tremendous potency of the grace of trusting people.

There is much in the imperial policy of Rome which foreshadows that of Great Britain! "Each Roman colony was a fresh representation of the Roman people in miniature. The magistrates elected by the citizens, or rather by the Senate of the colony, fulfilled on a small scale the functions of their prototypes in Rome and like them were attended by lictors bearing *fascēs*, or bundles of rods ; their authority within their district and over its inhabitants excluded even that of the governor of the province."* This last sentence, however, serves to accentuate the real difference between the Roman and the modern British policy. While Rome and Britain alike gave to their colonies their own domestic institutions, the Roman colony was usually an isolated tract in the conquered territory, established largely in order to romanise it gradually, and accorded the privileges of the homeland. The British policy, on the other hand, has been to establish the free

* Hastings' "Dictionary of the Bible," III., 837.

institutions of the homeland in all its acquired territories as soon as they are in a position to operate them. There are tracts of the British Empire where the populations are plainly unready for self-government; and even in India, where the difficulties are enormous, the possibilities of development in this direction are not lost sight of.

That the modern colonial policy of Great Britain is of comparatively recent origin is unquestionable, and it is probably right to date it from Lord Durham's famous report upon Canada. It would take us too far afield to trace in detail the transformation which has taken place in the relation of the motherland to the colonies; nor can it be regarded as a progressive development out of the old situation. It seems rather to have grown as the practical outcome of the advance of liberal ideas in Great Britain in the earlier part of the last century. It is always idle to trace developments of this kind to a single root; they are formed by the confluence of many currents of thought and feeling. Nevertheless it may be true that in the last analysis the name of Bentham may be found at the head of the greatest of the streams which produced this revolution.* The great change in the relation of Great Britain to her colonies which accounts for the imperial unity of our time may be said to have taken place between 1840 and 1870. Nor is it correct merely to say that this change consisted in the grant of self-government to the colonies. There were self-governing colonies

* It is true that in his earlier days Bentham wished to cut the colonies adrift; but in his later years he changed his mind. Of Durham's indebtedness to Bentham, see "Cambridge Modern History," XI., pp. 756 ff.

previous to this ; there was a two-chamber system of Government (legislative council and popular assembly with partial or complete financial control) in Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. But the Governor-general chose his own executive independently of them. "The consequence had been to produce relations between executive and legislature that were not only everywhere inharmonious, but were everywhere threatening to the authority of the Governor, and thus indirectly to the imperial connection."* The Governor stood, of course, for the imperial connection, and it is easy to see that friction between the Governor and the people would lead to disaffection towards the Empire, and tend to a demand for separation. As it was, there had been no little disunion, and in the two Canadas actual rebellion. Durham saw that the only possible remedy for this situation was to "establish a working identity of will and interest between the governors and their executives on the one hand, and the popular assembly on the other." This necessitated that "the control of the popular chamber over the executive should be made real and effective ; and with certain reservations and limitations, the executive should be made responsible to the parliamentary majority of the Lower House, as in England. In a word, representative should be succeeded by responsible government. In this way the interests of the executive council, of the majority of

* "Camb. Mod. Hist.," XI., p. 757., Ch. XXVII. of this volume gives a full and clear account of the transformation wrought by the Durham policy.

the popular assembly, and of the people at large, would be bound up with maintaining the existing form of government."*

How far a journey this represents from the earlier colonial policy of Britain may be gathered from Sir James Seeley's description of the latter. "It claimed to rule the colonists because they were Englishmen and brothers, and yet it ruled them as if they were conquered Indians. And again, while it treated them as conquered people, it gave them so much liberty that they could easily rebel."† The situation which Durham found in Canada was a development from these conditions. The liberty guaranteed by representative institutions was granted; yet it was limited by the uncontrolled power of the Governor as representing the sovereign imperial interests. The transformation begun by Durham and completed by Lords Elgin and Grey was that of recognizing that colonial peoples were to be treated not as subject nations but as Englishmen and brothers, to whom, wherever they were, were due those liberties which Englishmen enjoyed at home, and which were broad enough to make rebellion unthinkable and impossible. "Durham pledged himself that the adoption of his system of responsible government and of his view of the mutual obligations and privileges of motherland and colony would lead not to separation but to unity. Never was a promise more strikingly fulfilled or confidence more signally justified."‡

* "Camb. Mod. Hist.," XI., pp. 757 ff.

† J. R. Seeley, "The Expansion of England," p. 81. Lecture IV. in this book contains a brilliant description of the old Colonial system.

‡ "Camb. Mod. Hist.," XI., p. 758.

This was the beginning of the new colonial policy. In the fourteen years between 1846 and 1860,* five colonies in British North America and six in Australasia received responsible government.* And the same tendency may be seen operating in the gradual diminution of interference by the Home Government in the domestic affairs of the colonies. The right of such interference has never been statedly surrendered, and in the case of native races was continuously exercised. Even as late as 1885 Bechuanaland, which naturally might have been annexed to Cape Colony, was still administered directly by the Home Government. But the process of the years, and the experience they have brought, has taught the Crown that the colonies can be trusted to deal with native races with prudence and generosity, and usually with more success than itself. With this exception, the policy of leaving the colonies to control their own life was consistently pursued. "The complete abrogation by the Imperial Government during the fifties and the sixties of rights of control over the State (or Crown) lands, and over the land policy of self-governing colonies, not only made it clear that the Home Government was determined to deal generously with them, but set the final seal upon its policy of entrusting local affairs to local governments."† The execution of the policy has not been free from mistakes; nor has it been followed always with a steady consistency. This, nevertheless, is the real ground of the unity of Greater Britain to-day.

Nor is this all. It is frequently averred that the

* "Camb. Mod. Hist.," XI., p. 761.

† *Ibid.*, p. 760.

success of British foreign policy has depended upon the skill with which it has played off the rivalries of European states against each other. Professor Usher tells us that we have won our present position "by taking advantage of the mutual jealousies and rivalries of Europe."* On this analogy it would have been the most promising policy for England towards her colonies to have held them by keeping them as isolated units, and by playing upon their rivalries to prevent any possible combination of them that might imperil imperial unity. The reverse of this has been the case. The great experiment of responsible self-government has been followed up by the great experiment of confederation. Instead of leaving the colonies as separate provinces directly linked up to the Imperial Government, it has been the policy to federate them into great nations. The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, all represent the bold and successful policy of confederation. On the face of it it seemed a singularly improvident policy to permit the creation of a new political unity of quite incalculable power and possibility, which might find it easy at any time to withdraw from the imperial alliance. It seemed, moreover, to many to be an adventure of peculiar unwisdom to attempt to combine monarchical institutions with so thorough an application of federal principles. It was palpably a mating of incongruities. But all fears and forebodings have been completely dissipated by the event. "Provincial jealousies have dwindled to vanishing point; racial antipathies no

* "Pan-Germanism," p. 269.

longer imperil the prosperity of the Dominion; religious animosities have lost their mischievous power in a new atmosphere of common justice and toleration. Canada has, as the direct outcome of confederation, grown strong, prosperous, energetic. The unhappy divisions which prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and which darkened with actual revolt and bloodshed the dawn of the Victorian era, are now only a memory. The links which bind the Dominion to Great Britain may on paper seem slight, but they are resistless. . . . Canada is a nation within the Empire, and in Kipling's phrase is 'daughter in her mother's house, and mistress in her own.' '*

In the previous chapter we saw that respect for personality and respect for nationality must be the fixed points, the regulative ideas of all sound and stable political development. It may be maintained without challenging serious contradiction that the modern colonial policy of Great Britain embodies these two principles. That the policy has been the conscious application of these principles cannot be held. It has been rather a case of "muddling through" here as so frequently in our history. But whether consciously or unconsciously these ideas were present in the minds of those in whom our colonial policy took shape, though it is improbable that they would have formulated them in the way in which we are now doing. That self-government is the only possible form of government consistent with respect for personality need hardly be argued. The concession of a franchise is an acknowledgment of the rights of personality, of the indepen-

* "Camb. Mod. Hist.," XI., p. 775.

dence and the responsibility of the individual. The policy of federation in the same way is not merely an acknowledgment of nationality, but the creation of new national entities which are recognised as possessing parity of standing within the Empire. Respect for nationality has been shown in the British policy in the treatment of the French in Canada, and of the Dutch in South Africa, in such measures as the preservation of the Taal in schools. That in other directions the British attitude on the question of nationality has not been consistent with its colonial practice is beyond question true. But it has paid the penalty of this lower platform in the treatment of nationalities in trouble and failure. Ireland is a case in point. The root of the protracted British failure in Ireland has been a failure to recognize the claims and needs of nationality, and it is no speculative hope, but an assured faith, that the grant of Home Rule to Ireland will transform, as indeed it has already done, the whole temper of the Irish people in their relations to Great Britain.

But political achievements of this kind do not rest merely upon legislative enactments or on the logical application of abstract principles. They cannot be secured or sustained apart from an ethical quality in the relations of the parties concerned. A grant of self-government implies that the people to whom it is granted are to be trusted. It is an acknowledgment of their honour and their trustworthiness, and it is a common-place of our ordinary experience that there is nothing which so tends to evoke the response of respect as does respect itself. It calls out an echo of itself from those to whom it is shown. That the mother country

should so trust and respect her colonies that of her own accord she cuts the apron-strings and leaves them free to carve out their own destiny has had the result of binding them to her by stronger and more infrangible ties. This is the magic power of trustfulness. Trust has evoked trust, and it may be claimed that on the whole the conduct of the mother-country towards the colonies has been such as to guarantee her own trustworthiness. Just as we saw that a democracy can only be sustained on a basis of the mutual trust of its members, so a free empire must rest upon the same moral foundation. The bond of empire in Greater Britain is a bond of moral sentiment, and that is a bond which the force of arms is powerless to break.

II

Even more striking than the demonstration of the loyalty of the self-governing commonwealths of the Empire evoked by the war is the revelation of the universal loyalty of India. The colonies are peopled for the greater part by folk of British or of European origin ; but India is a country of many " nations and kindreds and peoples and tongues," with a variety of religions, and all belonging to other racial stocks. Nor do the external political arrangements which exist in the rest of the Empire afford any explanation of Indian loyalty ; for they do not exist there. " In its internal aspect the British Empire may be viewed as comprising a most varied series of political communities, ranging from states under absolute despotism to colonial democracies with the most extensive self-government."*

* " Camb. Mod. Hist.," p. 755.

Canada stands at the one pole; India at the other. Nor can it be urged that India is held within the empire by military coercion. The total membership of the Indian Regular Army is under 330,000 men; of these a little over 75,000 are British troops, whereas the population of British India is not far short of two hundred and fifty million souls. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that beside the territory directly administered by the British *raj* there are six or seven hundred principalities of varying size and exercising various degrees of independence under British suzerainty. The total area of the native states is over a million square miles, with a population of seventy-one millions. How comes it that this vast, heterogeneous mass of humanity should be living together in perfect domestic peace and should, when danger threatened a distant nation which had come by the fortunes of history to be its ruler, rise with general unanimity in defence of it?

Our first interest in India was commercial. It began with the grant of a charter to the London East India Company in 1600, and for more than two hundred years the commercial interest was predominant. During this period the power of the Company became very great; and its growth in power opened the door to abuses of which the Home Government had to take account. It began to be realized clearly that we had not only privileges in India but responsibilities, that we were bound to care for the people whom we exploited. This feeling received expression in Fox's East India Bill, the second reading of which on December 1st, 1783, became the

occasion of one of the great outstanding and formative political utterances of British history,—the famous speech in which Burke supported the Bill. One phrase in that speech has become proverbial. As he drew near the end of his speech, he recalled a saying of Henry IV. of France, that he wished to see a fowl in the pot of every peasant in his kingdom; and this Burke applied to Fox, who, he said, might well claim that “he secures the rice in his pot for every man in India.”* Another expression used by Burke in the same connection may be claimed as describing to a great extent the character of more recent British policy in India—the words “hazardous benevolence.” It would be untrue to say that this has been a consistent characteristic of our dealing with India since that day; and there has been a good deal that must be described as mean and contemptible in our relations to the natives of India. Nevertheless it is not to be questioned that the passing of the Bill of 1783, despite its subsequent rejection by the Lords, and Burke’s speech marked a turning point in our attitude to India, and quickened within the British people a growing sympathy with and an increasing sense of responsibility for the people of India. Burke passed in review, in burning words which have not yet lost their heat, the whole story of the delinquencies of the Company; and if it be too much to say that he laid down a set of formulated principles for the government of India, he nevertheless did describe once for all the true spirit and temper in which Indian affairs should be approached and handled. This tradition has

* Burke’s Works (1815), Vol. IV., p. 130.

survived in the British attitude to the Indian people. Over and over again it has been reaffirmed in solemn language. In the proclamation of 1858, the Queen said, "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and these obligations by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. It is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security; and in their gratitude our best reward." King Edward renewed his mother's undertaking: "It is my wish that there may be spread over the land a network of schools and colleges from which will go forth loyal and manly and useful citizens able to hold their own in the industries and agriculture, and all the vocations in life. And it is my wish too that the homes of my Indian subjects may be brightened and their labour sweetened by the spread of knowledge and all that follows in its train, a higher level of thought, of comfort and of health. It is through education that my wish will be fulfilled, and the cause of education in India will ever be close to my heart." So the policy of "hazardous benevolence" has developed. But has performance kept step with promise? He would be a rash man who asserted it. We have left undone many things which we ought to have done. Yet let India herself bear witness. Speaking of the Proclamation of 1858, Mr. Bhupendranath Basu, formerly a member of the

Imperial Legislative Council in India, says : " However short the actual administration of India may have fallen of this great ideal, the Indian people have regarded it as the fundamental principle of British rule in India. . . . There has been on the whole fair progress ; education, railways, irrigation, a greatly improved administration of law, a common language as the medium of interchange of thoughts and ideas, a growing spirit of nationality, a common government and common ideals, internal peace and freedom from external aggression have marked the history of British rule in India during the latter half of the nineteenth century. . . . India has never doubted. Her heart has been wholly with British rule ; the foundations of her faith and loyalty have been too well and firmly laid to be lightly disturbed."* " From the British," says Mr. D. N. Bannerjee, " India has received pledges and assurances (like the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, and the Royal Act of 1833), which in spite of their only partial fulfilment so far, have in them the promise and potentialities of eventual fruition into rights and political status that would indeed make the Indians ' equal subjects of the King.' The present Liberal administration which has given India the ' Reformed Councils,' and a viceroy of the stamp of Lord Hardinge, is certainly one whose objective is to minimise distrust and suspicion and to adopt conciliation and political concession as more powerful solvents of difficulties in the administration."† To this testimony let another more picturesque be

* *Daily News*, October 27th, 1914.

† *Westminster Gazette*, October 27th.

added. A correspondent of the Italian paper *Il Secolo* had an interview with an Indian soldier in France. "Are you glad," asked the newspaper man, "to have come here to fight for a country which is not yours,—France—at the bidding of another country, England, which dominates you?" The Indian regarded him with a look of wonder and indignation, and replied, "India is not oppressed by any one; she is a part and not a small part of a great Empire. Therefore the Indians are not slaves of this Empire, but subjects, as are the English, the Scottish, the Irish. The English Empire is menaced by a nation called Germany, and to defend itself it has appealed to all its subjects. If the Empire were menaced in India, the English soldiers would have gone there; but as it is menaced in Europe, we have come here." And he added proudly, "We are English."* The policy of "hazardous benevolence" has not failed.

But even more than to an abstract principle or a practical policy is the present spirit of India due to the men in whom the principle and the policy received a living embodiment and who made the tradition of Indian administration. Burke, in the speech already referred to, speaks with a withering contempt of "the boys we send to India," and deplores the system which enables them to return home "full grown in fortune long before they are ripe in principle." It would be impossible to deny that there has always been a certain number of harsh, incompetent and foolish persons among those to whose hands the administration of Indian affairs has been entrusted. But we need

* *Times*, October 29th, 1914.

only contrast the state of things in Burke's time with, say, the period of John Lawrence's leadership in the government of the Panjab, to realize how vast a transformation has come over our conduct of Indian affairs. Once men went to India to get out of her what they could ; but men have since gone out to India to give their best to her. The story of John Lawrence in the Panjab is a most luminous clue to the secret of the Indian loyalty of to-day. Eight years after the end of the second Sikh war, and Dalhousie's annexation of the Panjab, John Lawrence was able to send out of the Panjab steady reinforcements of loyal troops to assist in quelling the Mutiny ; and it is a commonplace that it was the Panjab that saved the power of England in India at that crisis. When the Sikh army had been disbanded, it became necessary to raise a force to defend the frontier, and it was raised without difficulty. The Sikhs hesitated for a moment, but eventually joined the various Panjab races who had first answered the call, and "since then they have rendered us valiant service, whenever and wherever they have been called upon to do so. . . . Within a year of their being raised, several of the Panjab irregular regiments shed their blood in our service, and henceforward they were seldom to shed it in any other cause."*

How was so great confidence engendered in so short a time ? It was a triumph of character, and pre-eminently the triumph of the two brothers Henry and John Lawrence. Their influence worked in two ways. They on the one hand secured the trust of the

* Bosworth Smith, "Life of Lord Lawrence" (Nelson), p. 158.

people; and on the other hand they infected their subordinates with their own spirit. "It was here (at Lahore) that following the example set them by the two brothers, the master-spirits of Henry and John Lawrence, a whole band of men learnt lessons of simplicity and contentment, of absorption in their work, and of sympathy with the natives, which they were never afterwards to unlearn, and which may still be said to be a real power in India. It was from such materials and under such influences that one of the noblest portions of the great fabric of our Indian Empire was being built up."* Edwardes, Nicholson, Temple, Montgomery—these are some of the more obvious names in the Lawrence tradition, and they indicate what its quality was. It is a quality of trustworthiness and even-handedness and of humanity. It is quaintly suggestive of the character of these men that Nicholson became the unwilling object of a religious cultus, with fakirs who claimed to be in his service!

Not only did the men concerned in the administration of the Panjab evoke confidence by reason of their character, but the work they did and the spirit in which they did it could not fail to impress the natives with the advantages of British rule. The record of the work of the Panjab Board, under the leadership of John Lawrence, is far too long and varied even to be epitomised here. But one or two instances of the insight and wisdom of the policy pursued may be given. When after the disarming of the Sikhs, the Board set to work to establish an effective police force, much of the local organization and control was left

* Bosworth Smith, "The Life of Lord Lawrence," p. 129.

in the hands of the native revenue officers. This confidence in the natives was a policy which was bound to justify itself. Cattle-stealing, Dacoity and Thuggism were sternly dealt with and destroyed. "As regards legislation the customs of the natives were as far as possible taken as the basis of the law. . . . Accordingly a code of native customs was drawn up. Those which were absolutely bad and seemed to be incapable of improvement were forbidden. Those which related to marriage and divorce, and tended as they do in most Eastern countries to the degradation of the female sex, were first modified and then accepted. Those which related to such subjects as inheritance and adoption were incorporated at once. The *Tahsildars* (native revenue officers), whose local knowledge marked them out as the best judges of local matters of small importance, were confirmed in their judicial, as they had been already in their police authority. Each village or group of adjoining villages thus retained a court of its own, sanctioned by immemorial custom. . . . The varieties of land tenure were numerous and complicated, but they were time-honoured ; and it was the honourable mission of the Board in no case to destroy, but only to revivify and to preserve."* Much more might be added ; but it is particularly worth observing how carefully native prejudices and sentiments were respected. This is akin to that respect for nationality which we saw to be indispensable in imperial and international relations. Contempt and removal of local customs are notoriously provocative of resentment and opposition ; but the

* Bosworth Smith, " Life of Lord Lawrence," pp. 163 ff.

entire policy of the Panjab Board seems to have been animated by a genuine desire to conciliate the natives of the Punjab. It was this, together with the material advantages which accrued, especially to land cultivators, that quickened and stimulated the growth of confidence among the natives in their British rulers. At any rate what was proved after eight years was that the Panjab was so completely won that it was its loyalty that saved the British standing in India when it was threatened by the Mutiny. It was from the Panjab that troops kept rolling up in swift succession to reinforce the men who were set to besiege Delhi, or to relieve the Residency at Lucknow. It was a triumph of character and trustworthiness and humanity.

That in the main has been the story of British rule in India. It would be idle to assert that we have never made grievous mistakes, or that our good faith has never been doubted with some measure of justice. But the wonder is that in a task of such extraordinary difficulty, corruption should have been so rare and failures so few. We have not yet finished our work in India. There is much that we have yet to give to the natives of India. That India is ready for self-government no one is bold enough to affirm ; but the general movement of our work in India is in that direction. It is true that of recent years there has been some unrest and agitation. But this only proves the value and authenticity of our achievements in India. It is the product of the larger vision yielded by the progress of education. They who are wise will see in the unrest of India not a menace but a promise. It is the

sign of awakening self-consciousness—a self-consciousness blundering in its infancy, but containing the seed of that sense of Indian unity upon which the security and prosperity of that vast territory must ultimately rest.

Two things we may claim to be proved by the imperial record of Great Britain.

The first is that good government, that is, the kind of government which makes for liberty, prosperity and domestic peace, which produces a loyal, united and contented people, rests upon an acknowledgment of the principles of personality and nationality. Not only our successes but our failures also point to the same conclusion. We have come to grief just when we have failed to respect personality and nationality, by policies of force and coercion, or by contempt of racial susceptibilities.

The second is that principles of government, if they are to succeed, require an ethical setting. The record shows us plainly that there are two moral attitudes which supremely matter,—first, the preservation of a strict integrity and faithfulness to covenants ; second, the virtue of trusting other people. In the last analysis the British Empire, let it be again repeated, stands upon the twin potencies of trustworthiness and trustfulness. Without these the best political principles will fail. Without these no community can hold together. These are the moral conditions of freedom and of peace. Great and stirring as the story of British arms is, it contains no achievement comparable in its courage or its consequences with this adventurous faith in moral principles. Here is the secret of the

Colonial and Indian loyalty which has in these last weeks moved us so strangely, so deeply. We have found it peculiarly uplifting, yet peculiarly humbling. We realize, as we remember many questionable passages in our history, how little we have deserved it. But we cannot suppress a sense of gratitude and pride as we remember the great succession of those—statesmen, soldiers, merchants, missionaries—who have gone forth through the Empire, and have by their integrity, their even-handedness, their humanity, their self-sacrifice, made the British name an object of devotion, of love and honour,—the fruits of whose lives and labours we see to-day in the splendid spectacle of the infrangible unity of Greater Britain.

CHAPTER V

A WORLD SET FREE

I

THE modern imperial policy of Great Britain is plainly at the extreme opposite pole from the ideal of Pan-Germanism. Our experience, whether of success or of failure, contradicts the fundamental assumptions upon which the Prussian policy seems to rest. It may be claimed that the success of the British policy, demonstrated as it is to-day by the universal loyalty and unity of the Empire, is a *prima facie* condemnation and a proof of the inevitable failure of Pan-German principles.

No attempt has been made in these pages to defend many of the historical passages connected with the origins of our Empire. No defence can be made for them. The one plea one may be permitted to make is that they were no worse, as Sir James Seeley points out, than analogous passages in the history of the contemporary imperial enterprises of other States. But the distinctive character of the British imperial policy in its development is the slow but steady awakening of the sense of moral responsibility for the people in acquired territories. The dominions ceased to be regarded as the milch cows of British commerce. British statesmen saw that they were really trusts

to be administered for the highest good of their inhabitants. This is not to say that the advantages of colonial possession to the motherland were overlooked. But it was seen to be possible to establish a real community of interest between the colonies and the motherland, in which the highest good of both might be achieved.

It may be claimed that this trust has been administered with a broad consistency of rectitude and humanity,—a consistency not always unbroken or never overclouded,—yet on the whole maintained with no little steadfastness. A certain strain of idealism seems to run through the modern attitude of Britain to its dependencies and colonies, and in this there has been a recognition of an authority above the State. It would be an exaggeration to say that the Empire has been governed and administered “in the fear of God.” Nevertheless, there has been an acknowledgment of supra-national moral sanctions, which is itself an expression more or less conscious of a belief in the moral government of the universe. Unexpressed though it may have been in these actual terms, this does represent a real faith in God and man. It may have been inarticulate, but it was there all the same. There has been no Pharisaical invocation of God in the conduct of imperial affairs, but there has been a more or less steady, if vague and unformulated, acknowledgment that the ultimate court of appeal in human affairs is the God of the whole earth. In the pavement of the central entrance hall of the Houses of Parliament there is a Latin verse of Scripture inlaid: “Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build

it." Whatever success has attended the process of consolidating the British Empire, it must be ascribed to a certain if not always unwavering obedience to those universal ethical principles which are the expression of the will of God.

It is undeniably true that if all the delinquencies which may be proved against us in the course of our long imperial history were massed together, they would constitute a formidable indictment of our good faith and our humanity. That is a reflection which should preserve us from assuming an attitude of smug moral self-complacency. But it is maintained, nevertheless, that on a fair reading of all our history, the view stated in these pages must stand. Nor is it for a single moment suggested that the British people have had a monopoly of all the virtues. It is simply asserted that the history of the British people does entitle us to assume that they have learnt *some* of the principles and have partly acquired *some* of the virtues which do at least make for the general good of the race. We are not *the* chosen people; but that should not shut from our view the real presumption that we are *a* chosen people among others; and that in the providence of God we have been endued with some rays of light and some gifts of character by which we shall be enabled to fulfil the place allotted to us in the divine plan for the world.

The British Empire is a symbol and a promise of what all the world may become—a confederation of peoples living together harmoniously, in peace and mutual loyalty, in the bonds of a genuine if not as yet a complete co-operation. This does not mean that a further expansion of the British Empire would be for

the good of the world ; but we may humbly claim that at least the British Empire shows the way. It is a great experiment in the direction of " the federation of the world," and the political and moral principles upon which the British Empire rests to-day are those same principles upon which the world must build if it is to become a great human commonwealth of liberty and peace.

But it may be urged that what has been possible within the Empire may be quite impossible without. There is after all a certain native coherency in the British Empire, and the conditions that prevail within it are not those which we find in the mixed world outside the Empire. The answer to this objection is plain. The political principles and moral relations which have wrought the consolidation of the Empire are of universal currency. There is nothing national or local about them ; they may be applied and will work equally as well in international affairs as they have done in the inner relationships of the British Empire. Respect for personality and nationality as the regulative principles of public affairs, whether domestic or foreign, the moral bonds of trustworthiness and trustfulness—in this combination lies a force which can achieve anywhere in the world that which it has so signally accomplished within the British Empire.

II

Were an average Briton to be asked what he considered his most precious heritage to be, he would without doubt say it was his liberty. But it may be questioned whether he could give any lucid account of

how he came by it. He would probably say something about Magna Charta, and Ship-money, and the Reform Bill; but of the deeper, less tangible currents of thought and feeling which expressed themselves in the great liberating episodes of his national history he would know comparatively little. Yet our liberty stands to-day upon the success with which personality has secured a measure of respect for its integrity and sanctity and upon the degree of moral elevation which has accompanied its struggle for room. Space-hunger is inherent in it,—and it is the driving force which has enabled it to achieve so much in the way of liberty. The gradual evolution of the British constitution is the outward and visible sign of this ascending effort; and it is no idle boast that nowhere in the world has rational liberty been so completely realized. That there is yet much land to be possessed in this matter among us we are not concerned to deny. The edifice of British liberty is not yet completed. But it is not for nothing that the British legislature has been called “the Mother of Parliaments.”

In our modern colonial policy it has been our aim to reproduce in acquired territories the liberties of the homeland. This has been done by transplanting to them our political institutions. We have seen the process by which the Colonies received full and responsible self-government. There, as in England, the moral sequels of this confidence in the people have followed. It is true that it is a mistaken policy to grant liberty to a people not adequately prepared for it; but it is no less true that at a certain point, the grant of free institutions does itself stimulate a people

to a real effort to become worthy. It is a commonplace of our experience how the sense of responsibility makes for sobriety and steadiness ; and it is generally true that respect for the rights of individuals and communities does effect a moral quickening. Liberty has its perils ; but its possibilities for good are demonstrably much greater. It remains yet to be demonstrated that a people which has achieved a genuine liberty and has valued its privilege has suffered moral deterioration. Periods of moral languor do no doubt invade communities ; in such periods their liberties are endangered ; and it is in such periods that their liberties have sometimes been curtailed, with the result of confirming and accentuating the moral depression. But a nation which jealously guards its liberties does not suffer in this way. The price of liberty, it has been well said, is eternal vigilance ; but this kind of vigilance simply consists in living up to the privilege of liberty. To use our liberties is their best defence. That is why the political indifference which sometimes invades democracies is so grievous a peril. The people which does not affirm its liberties stands to lose them.

But with all the admitted defects in our way of life, we may not forget that our struggles for liberty have been the guide and the inspiration of others bent upon the same splendid quest. That the United States of America have essentially the same political system as ourselves is not to be wondered at. The difference between Republicanism and a Constitutional Monarchy is a difference of detail rather than a difference of kind. In both alike the ultimate sovereignty of the

people is affirmed ; and the king or the president, as the case may be, is the symbol and the mouthpiece of the national life. The liberties of Britain and America are fruits of the same tree. But elsewhere we find that, in spite of all the natural differences of racial temper, men have looked to our British record for light and leading in the struggle for liberty. It is a commonplace that Cavour, the regenerator of Italy, derived his political ideas and inspirations from the study of British constitutional history ; and it would be difficult to estimate the extent to which British precedents have influenced the institutions of democratic countries. In Russia, in the early years of this century, " the political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional history had aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day Englishman. The difference was that the Cadets sought to apply English principles, and the Octobrists felt a kinship with English instincts. All three Dumas representing different aspects of Russian opinion, were remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for quotation."*

But it is not only by example, but by active sympathy that England has stimulated and assisted liberating movements in other lands. It was England that, in 1823, first recognized the nationality of Greece in its revolution against Turkey, and though it did not extend any active support to the revolutionaries, there was in existence a London Greek Committee, of which

* "Camb. Mod. Hist.," XII., p. 379.

Byron was a member, and under the auspices of which he made his famous but ill-starred intervention in the dispute. It was England, too, that first, though in an informal and unofficial way, recognized the United Kingdom of Italy in 1861; and here again, though no armed assistance was officially given, there was an English legion that served under Garibaldi. In that great and stirring period of revolution in the middle of the last century there was hardly a single nation struggling for independence and liberty to which England did not extend sympathy and moral assistance. When the King of Prussia conceded a constitution after the Revolution of 1848, and the Austrian Prince Schwarzenberg urged the repeal of the grant, "in this conflict with liberal principles he found his only declared opponents in England, and especially in Lord Palmerston." It was of the greatest advantage to the struggling nations of Europe at that period that so staunch a friend of popular liberties as Palmerston should have been at the British Foreign Office. His zeal frequently outran his discretion and embarrassed the Government, but his own popularity in the country showed how faithfully he reflected the general attitude of England to the liberating movements on the Continent. It was Palmerston who circulated through the courts of Europe the famous letters in which Gladstone described the Neapolitan Government as "the negation of God." Again and again England has intervened, either alone or in concert with others, on behalf of oppressed peoples, as in the case of Hungary in 1849, for the Italians against Austria in 1853, and for the Poles in 1863.

There is another interesting range of facts which demonstrate the contribution which England has made to the history of liberty. It has been in modern times the great sanctuary of the political exile. The name of Mazzini occurs immediately in this connection, and indeed there are few European countries from which revolutionary thinkers and leaders have not come to seek refuge in England. After Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* in 1851, a large number of the republican leaders fled to England. In 1858, political agitators from Naples, shipped for America, managed to land in England. When Russia was pressing Turkey to deliver up Kossuth and other Magyar leaders, it was England that strengthened Turkey's hand in refusal, going even the length of making a naval demonstration. "England had realized its own national individuality long before, but the great exiles Kossuth and Mazzini found ready sympathy, and when Garibaldi visited England, he was greeted as a hero. These were but the most conspicuous of a numerous band. Carlyle has left pictures touched with his customary vividness, of the exiles whom the national movements on the continent had driven to England; and one of the greatest poets of the time, Rossetti, was himself a son of a political exile. Sympathy with nationalism was natural in a country which believed itself to have attained what Hungary and Italy and other countries were striving for, and it was made all the keener by the presence of the exiles."* This temper reflected itself in contemporary literature. Tennyson, Sidney Dobell, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, A. H. Clough and other

* "Camb. Mod. Hist.," XI. p. 351.

poets of the period give a genuine expression to the English sympathy with all those who were fighting for freedom.

III.

Out of this emerges a plain fact : the British people are charged with the obligations of a great tradition. Within its own borders and within its Empire, Britain has achieved liberty, and with liberty, domestic peace. Surely it is not possible to evade the conclusion that it is its mission to pass on this gift to the world. Not that it has a monopoly of the gift. The French and the American people among the great nations share it equally with us, and it is their mission no less than ours to make the whole world partakers of the same good. The ideal that is implicit in our history is that of "a world set free." We make no boast of a culture which we would impose upon the world for its good. We are simply the heirs of a great, and priceless privilege, and we hold it in trust for the world. But the conditions both of preserving and imparting the gift are inviolate trustworthiness and adventurous trustfulness in public affairs, both at home and abroad. It is the vocation of our nation to proclaim, and by its practice to prove to the world, the faith that the promise of the liberty and the peace of the world lies in those political institutions which are founded upon respect for personality and nationality, and in that recognition and discharge of moral obligation without which no political institutions in the world, and least of all free institutions, will work.

A World set free,—here assuredly is our calling and

our mission. It is a real sense of the glory and splendour of such a mission that we require to-day in order to make permanent and effectual the national unity to which in this time of common anxiety we have attained. Indeed, it is hardly fair to ascribe our present comradeship wholly to the sense of common danger. The case of Belgium has appealed to our chivalry; and we claim to have to a very considerable degree entered upon this war from the same motives as those which prompted Palmerston's interventions in the national movements of the forties and fifties of the last century. We are concerned for the liberties of a little people. At the same time, the entire trend of the argument of this little book goes to prove that liberties are not secured by force, but by the operation of moral principles. Wars of liberation have, no doubt, paved the way for freedom; but they have not established it. The destruction of tyranny does not of necessity imply the birth of liberty. The French Revolution produced Napoleon. It is at the present time of quite extraordinary importance that we should recognize just how much and how little the desired victory of the Allies in the present war will secure. It may shatter the pretensions of Prussian militarism, and the hopes which have animated the German *Welt-politik*. But war is only destructive; and if there is to be real reconstruction, we must make room for the working of moral forces. There is a great deal of quite fantastic talk about the possible consequences of the present war. 'It is, we are told, a war which will end war. It may quite as easily be a war which will bind the shackles of war on Europe for

many a generation. If German force is destroyed, it will be by a superior combination of forces; and whatever the issue of the war, which side soever wins, the militarists and materialists and reactionaries of all kinds will have the immediate logic on their side. But we must appeal from their logic to the witness of history and teach our people to realize that the one thing which is going to end war is the extension to international affairs of those political ideas and moral sentiments which have established liberty and peace within the Empire. It is desirable that there should be an agreement as to disarmament, but we must not allow ourselves to be deceived into thinking that a merely mechanical device of this kind is going to deliver us from the barbarism of war in the future. The treatment of France by Germany in 1870 should not be forgotten by us to-day. The remoter causes of the present war are many and complex; but one of the strongest of them is the hatred which Germany left behind her in France in 1870. She sowed then seeds of bitterness, the appalling harvest of which she is reaping to-day. The only antidote to the war-spirit is good-will; and the only begetter of good-will is a policy—to use Burke's expression—of "hazardous benevolence." The peace of the world in the future depends upon the degree to which we shall insist that the healing grace of generosity shall influence the terms of settlement. Thereby shall be laid truly and well the foundation of that increasing mutual trust and respect between the nations now at war, in which, and in which alone, is the hope of the passing of war.

To this there are one or two obvious corollaries.

Reference has already been made to the practice of secret diplomacy; and so long as diplomatic transactions are conducted in secret, so long will there be a fruitful source of international suspicion and distrust. It is perfectly plain that diplomatic negotiations are frequently of such a character that premature publicity may be injurious to the interests concerned; but at least it should be understood that no decisive steps should be taken without full discussion in Parliament before the eyes of the whole nation. There is at last nothing to be lost and everything to be gained by transacting the public business of nations in open daylight. That foreign affairs should be withdrawn from the operation of the democratic principle is an anachronism which ought to be tolerated no longer. This surely should be one of the aims to be kept in view when the present conflict is formally settled. While it continues, it will militate against that mutual trust and goodwill which is the only wholesome and effectual solvent of international friction.

Further, while it is no business of ours to interfere in the domestic affairs of nations, we should make it clear that the closeness of our relations to other states depends upon the measure in which they are democratic. To many people at the present time our alliance with Russia is extremely distasteful. Perhaps these people are doing less than justice to the possibilities of Russia. Nevertheless, as it is, it is a mating of incongruities and is full of dangers. Recent events in Persia illustrate the dangers of an alliance between a democracy and an autocracy. The situation which prevails to-day in Persia with our permission is one

of which a democratic people can think only with grave uneasiness. The one satisfactory element in the present position is that it may lead to extensive internal reforms in Russia, and it is not an unreasonable hope that our statesmen should inform the Russian authorities with what satisfaction and gratitude public opinion in this country would regard the extension of free institutions to the Russian people. But in this, as in everything else, example is infinitely more powerful than counsel; and nothing would so effectually stimulate the democratic movement throughout the world as the steady extension of self-government to the people of the Indian Empire and of Egypt. China, with its immeasurable possibilities, has in our time found itself and it is palpably of the first importance to the peace of the world that China should develop on democratic lines. It is peculiarly the mission of Britain together with France and the United States of America, to encourage the growth of free institutions throughout the world.

IV

But we must not lose sight of the fact that liberty is not an end. It is but a means to an end. It is the condition of full self-realization both for the individual and the nation. A world set free is a world entering upon a new plane of historical development.

It has been observed in a previous chapter that Jesus Christ's estimate of the worth of the soul is the cornerstone of genuinely free institutions. That there was a craving and a struggle for liberty in the world before Jesus appeared is a commonplace; but it was left to

Him to define the true ground and the regulative principle of the freedom for which men have always striven as soon as they have become conscious of themselves as men. The history of man is in a very real sense the history of the age-long struggle of the soul towards its heritage of perfect liberty, that fair country of which it dimly discerned the promise within itself; and it is no groundless claim that we make when we say that the craving for liberty found its true stimulus and interpretation in the Christian measure of human worth. This was one of those great germinal ideas which, when they once enter the mind of man become an irrepressible leaven, and though they may afterwards be forgotten and their true place in the development of thought overlooked, yet the impulse they generated remains. But it would be absurd to suppose that the human soul had achieved its goal when it had won its liberty. Its liberty is simply the condition which it requires for its perfect development. There is implicit in Jesus' teaching a doctrine of man far beyond anything that has yet been commonly current in the world. Singularly enough, it has been left to Nietzsche to recover what is essentially the New Testament doctrine of the superman. Nietzsche blundered when he began to picture the evolution of the superman. He was going, paradoxically, to make him go back along the road he had come. But none of us may quarrel with his view that a new type of manhood might be produced through "a favourable accumulation and augmentation of human powers and arrangements." Man is not yet at his goal. When he has achieved freedom he is only at his true starting

point. Man is to grow into the "full-grown man of the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." This is the true supermanhood, and liberty is the environment in which it is to be produced.

But freedom implies a social order ; and though the New Testament does not describe that social order, it nevertheless takes it for granted. It would not be wholly true to say that this social order is identical with the kingdom of God, but it is certain that it is the true condition of its coming. In the Apocalypse the Holy City, which is the symbolical name of the ultimate human society, is represented as coming down out of heaven from God, and it is impossible to separate apocalyptic ideas from the New Testament conception of the Kingdom of God. But it is to be observed that the Holy City comes down to a *new earth*, that is, into a world prepared for it. A world set free is a world prepared for the city of God. For a world set free will be a world in which man has come into his own, and will be ready for a new stage in the movement of the purpose of God.

We are to-day dazzled by the splendour of the British Empire ; as a human achievement it is unique, incomparable. But there is that which is greater and nobler than the Empire. It is the Kingdom of God. Into this Kingdom the nations of the earth are to bring their glory. Freed from suspicion and hate of one another, they will set about the task of cultivating their peculiar genius, and they will bring their wealth of thought and of knowledge, their harvest of art and love as tribute to the Kingdom of God, which is also the Kingdom of Man. It is given to us to prepare the

way of this greater Kingdom, by teaching the world such things as we ourselves have learned, the sacredness of personality and nationality, and the truth that liberty and peace are begotten in integrity and justice and mutual trust. This is our national share in that wide co-operation by which the kingdoms of this world shall become the Kingdom of our God and of His Christ.

CHAPTER VI

PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF

It is, we trust, hardly open to a critic of these pages to say that we have not looked upon the state of these islands with perfect candour, and if he were to venture upon the obvious criticism, "Physician, heal thyself," we may claim to have forestalled him in our acknowledgment of that need. That modern Britain presents a spectacle which is not in many respects in keeping with the nature and the extent of the possibilities which we have seen latent in her history, we regretfully confess; and let us be frank enough to make the further admission that she has no great contribution to make to the life of the world in the future except as she resolutely sets herself to put her own house in order.

To begin with, it is necessary that the British people should recognize all that is involved in the principle of liberty, and especially that a true rational liberty entails the duty of willingly accepting certain restrictions in the interests of the welfare of the whole. If liberty is to be preserved from becoming licence, it must be mated with perfect and equal justice,—that is a justice which rests upon respect for the legitimate rights of the other man. But what we require is a far more generous conception of the rights

of the other man ; and we have not got beyond the threshold of the truth regarding this matter when we have spoken of the "right to work," the "living wage," and decent house-room. These are but the bare necessary preliminaries of that spaciousness of life which is the native right of every human soul.

As a matter of fact we are confronted with the unquestionable circumstance that the labouring classes of this country are themselves awakening to a far more vivid conception of their natural rights than most of us seem to recognize. The inwardness of that phenomenon which we call "labour unrest" is passing by most of us. We seem to see in it nothing more than an arrogant class demand for fewer hours of work and larger pay. But these are but the outward and concrete expressions of something very much deeper and more dynamic. The advance of education in this country has opened the eyes of the workers to a much wider horizon ; it has started and developed in them visions and hopes which they cannot subdue ; it has liberated in them forces of expansion and ascension which no coercive measures can repress. Labour unrest is fundamentally the expression of the awakened native craving for a more spacious life. We may also take it for granted that the worker will get what he is seeking for. He is learning slowly but surely the extent of his power, and whether one likes it or not, one has to face the quite inevitable certainty that the worker will soon or late secure every condition which is genuinely necessary to the immeasurable possibilities of his soul. It has been said that the one wholly irresistible force which can afford to despise

frontiers and armies and navies is a growing population. There is much truth in this ; and there is no less truth in the analogous proposition that the other wholly irresistible force, which must soon or late break down every effort to withstand it, is a growing soul. In these islands to-day the soul of the worker is a growing soul.

Let it be admitted that the methods by which the worker is endeavouring to secure his immediate ends are open to question. But may not this be due to the circumstance that the character of the opposition which he has to encounter makes these methods inevitable ? It is useless to condemn strikes, until some other way has been indicated of achieving the same end. Nor is it very fruitful to ask the worker to bide his time, or to tell him that the processes of history are working on his side. He has been educated to believe that the processes of history have achieved most when they have been speeded up by more or less violent means ; and he may also answer, with perfect relevancy, that while he is waiting for the historical processes, the social leaven, and so forth, to do their work, the forces he is fighting will take the opportunity of entrenching themselves more strongly. As it is, he sees himself confronted with an array of vested interests, strongly organized and hanging together in a common desire for self-preservation ; and what he says is that if he cannot get his due, those rights which belong to him as a man, in any other way, he will compel the vested interests to yield them by force.

It is greatly to be desired that the propertied classes should re-examine their doctrine of property. They

profess great concern for their country; they are most clamorous in their demands for adequate defences by sea and by land; and there can be no question that they are genuinely jealous of the greatness and the honour of their country. But their country is apt to be something of an abstraction to them; and they do not consciously relate it to the concrete millions of people who are the nation, and of whom a great proportion are actually living under conditions which make impossible even bare physical efficiency. They fail to see that the wealth of a nation, whether in peace or war, is in a healthy, independent, and contented population. Immediately a measure of reform, which aims at the increase of the health, the contentment, the self-respect of the people, is proposed, it is confronted by the cry about the rights of property. What are the rights of property? That property has its rights no one will deny; but it is self-evident that they end when once they begin to encroach upon the rights of humanity. Property in land forfeits its rights and is legitimately interfered with when it neglects the health or encroaches on the freedom of the people who dwell and labour upon it. Resistance to measures of common welfare on the ground of the sanctity of property is as foolish as it is inhumane and unpatriotic. It is foolish, because it is useless; in a country in which a people is being educated the rights of property will make a very poor fight against the irresistible spiritual development which education stimulates. It is inhumane because it imposes, so long as it is successful, an unnatural servitude upon the growing souls of men. It is unpatriotic, because it resists the

cultivation of the true strength of the nation, a strong, healthy, self-reliant manhood.

What is needed, therefore, is such a real recognition and acknowledgment of native human rights as will lead to a revision of our notions of property and vested interests. If the working classes are not to resort to force in order to secure that spaciousness of life (which without any shadow of doubt whatsoever they are by some means or other going to achieve) then it must be by the frank and fair recognition of their inalienable right to what they are seeking ; and the rest of us must be prepared willingly to accept the consequent limitations. It may not be clear to us that this or that particular demand is just or is calculated to produce the end desired ; but what is wanted is the spirit which does not regard the demand as another fresh encroachment upon the rights of property, and therefore something to be resisted uncompromisingly, that good-will which will consider the demand on its merits and if its desirability is made evident will take steps to respond to it, even though that may for the time react unfavourably upon the size of dividends, and the price of stock. The landowner, the manufacturer, the captain of industry must learn to regard their possessions not as their own private gold-mines, but trusts upon which the first charge shall not be the preservation of their own dignities and incomes, but the well-being of the nation as a whole and in particular of those people with whom they have immediately to do.

We cannot hide from ourselves the fact that this state of things will not come about without what

Nietzsche would call a "transvaluation of values." The commonly accepted scale of values among us does undoubtedly tend to an exaggerated appreciation of mere material possessions and the elaboration and multiplication of the things that make for personal self-exaltation. Our scale of values is dominated by an ego-centric philosophy ; and even if our interests have broadened out beyond the purely selfish circle in recent times, they have been nevertheless strictly confined to the area of one's own particular class. Consequently the most conspicuous phenomenon of our recent history has been the creation of organizations with sectional aims,—organizations of landowners, and capitalists, middle-class defence leagues and trade federations. It has simply been the substitution of class selfishness for individual selfishness. A true awakening of the national consciousness would unquestionably lead to the disruption of many of these organisations as well as to the relaxing of partisan ties ; and it is one of the hopes of the present situation that our new-found unity may create a far more fruitful fellowship of persons, classes and parties in the future than we have known hitherto in our time. Nevertheless, if our scale of values is determined only by the principle of national welfare, we shall only develop a national selfishness which may very easily become the analogue of the Prussianism of which we are declaring our abhorrence to-day. Unqualified concentration upon national interests will certainly preserve that most disastrous and poisonous fallacy that every other nation is to be regarded as a commercial rival and therefore a possible predatory enemy. So long as this

view persists, and it does persist implicitly, even if it is not made explicit, in our bearing towards other nations, it is perfectly hopeless to do anything really effective in the way of reducing armaments, and of releasing forces for domestic progress which are to-day being utilized in wasteful international trials of strength. We have yet to learn the deep truth that the prosperity of one nation does not depend upon the impoverishment of another, but that the prosperity of the one makes for the prosperity of the whole.

Most of all do we need to learn that a man's life, or a nation's life, does not consist in a multitude of possessions. As we look out upon the past, we realize that the things that give nations immortality are not their conquests, their imperial or commercial expansion, but their triumphs in thought, in literature, in painting, in music or in religion. Shakespeare is an incomparably more wonderful and richer achievement of the English nation than the most wonderful of all empires. The thought and the sculpture of Greece still survive while its empire is only a memory. It is not easy for us to shake ourselves free from the prepossessions which spring from our upbringing in a materialistic age, in an age of unequalled commercial expansion and prosperity. We find it hard to think of national life except in terms of power and prosperity; and commercial considerations are allowed to determine our policies far too powerfully to serve our highest ultimate good. "Speaking broadly, there are just two kinds of political ideal—materialistic and spiritual. The one will regard the end of national life in terms of power, the other in terms of manhood; the imperialism of the one will be

commerical, that of the other will be humanitarian. The one will seek territorial expansion for the sake of what it can get out of it ; the other for what it can do for it. The one counts the wealth of the nation in its reserves of gold ; the other in its resources of manhood. The one regards the end of national life as the making of money and the security of property ; the other, as the making of men and the safeguarding of manhood."* We have in our review of the modern British colonial policy seen the working of a genuine spiritual idealism ; and what is most profoundly to be hoped for is that this particular idealism may reassert itself among us at the present time and work in our domestic life the transformation which it has wrought in our imperial relationships.

It comes to this then, that our most fundamental necessity is a revival of spirituality ; and it is not too much to say that the great curse of our generation has been the dominion of materialism throughout the Western world. The evidence for this is ubiquitous and plentiful. This materialism is the mainspring of all militarism ; it is the influence which has made markets and armaments the regulative factors in national affairs. It is the presupposition of the doctrine of the Balance of Power in Europe. To-day we claim to be engaged in a struggle to destroy this power in the most gigantic form which it has ever assumed ; and there is a real peril that we ourselves may be engulfed in it still more. Hitherto we have been saved

* I venture to quote this passage from my own book "The Renaissance of Faith" (p. 260), published about three years ago. The revelations of recent months have proved the truth of the contrasts which this passage contains.

from complete capitulation to it ; but signs are not wanting that already there are those among us who will make a strong effort to entangle us in its deadly meshes. We dare not obscure the fact from ourselves, that there will be a very powerful propaganda in the days immediately following the war to push home the immediate logic of the war (and for this purpose, it is immaterial which side wins) and to persuade us to shape our national lives in accordance with a military ideal. We shall be hard put to it to make our faith to prevail against the logic of the materialists. Still we may venture to cherish the confidence that the immediate result of the war may be a mighty recoil from militarism, and that the sheer criminal wastefulness and the widespread heartbreak of modern war, as it is being revealed to us to-day, will reinforce the pleading of those who believe that the true greatness and destiny of Great Britain lies along those lines of moral idealism which have achieved her most splendid historical triumphs.

It is one of the most ironical elements in the present situation that the extraordinary vogue of Rudolf Eucken in Germany should have so little counter-vailed the aims and the methods of Prussianism. Eucken with his gospel of the independent and sovereign spiritual life stands at extreme antipodes from Treitschke with his philosophy of blood and iron. But one suspects from some of Eucken's utterances relative to the present war that he has himself hardly seen the real ethical implications of his peculiar message. However that may be, it is evident from many circumstances that the life of modern Germany has been

characterized by a singular absence of real spirituality. Observers of the ecclesiastical institutions of Germany comment with singular unanimity upon the almost universal lack of spiritual reality in their life ; and the increasing number of formal secessions from the State churches in recent years has been one of the most remarkable phenomena of German life, especially when it is remembered that secession in Germany is a matter of some cost and difficulty. That within this vast expanse of spiritual sterility there are oases of life, is evident from the existence of missionary enterprise ; but relative to the general temper of the German people at large, these exceptions have been of no very great significance. " The great mass of our population," says Herr Walter Classen, of Hamburg, speaking especially of the cities, " are spiritually impoverished, and they are descending constantly to a lower spiritual and moral level."*

It would be a stupid blunder to assume that this depressed spirituality is a phenomenon confined to Germany. It has involved all the great nations of the West. Mr. Francis Grierson asserts that " there never was a time when so many officers in Germany and France have tried to sell their country for a mess of pottage,"† and this he attributes to the moral deterioration produced by materialism. The passage commonly current as " *Where there is no vision, the people perish* " is rendered in the Revised Version, " *Where there is no vision, the people cast off restraint.*"‡

* *The Constructive Quarterly*, September, 1914, p. 644.

† " *The Invincible Alliance*," p. 137.

‡ Prov. xxix. 18.

Where materialism prevails, where there is no vivid sense of eternal values, there follows inevitably that loosening of moral sanctions which produces a Krupp scandal in Germany, a canteen scandal in England, and a multitude of less spectacular but no less insidious moral declensions in the fabric of society. Most of all to this source must be traced the decline of public worship in Great Britain, which is no less significant than the secessions from the State Churches in Germany. The Churches themselves show how completely our life has been materialized, for they have been these many days testing their prosperity by counting heads and reckoning balances; and if the Churches themselves have so far lost their perception of eternal values, how is it to be expected that they should preserve the spirituality of the nation? Perhaps the aptest commentary upon modern England and its attitude to religion is a very ancient word: "Beware lest thou forget the Lord thy God, . . . lest when thou hast eaten and art full, and hast built goodly houses and dwelt therein, and when thy herds and thy flocks multiply, and thy silver and thy gold is multiplied, and when all that thou hast is multiplied, then thy heart be lifted up and thou forget the Lord thy God, . . . and lest thou say in thy heart, My power and the might of my hand hath gotten me this wealth." This is precisely what has happened to us. We have prospered and have become self-sufficient. We have left no space in our lives for God.

The same dominion of materialistic modes of thought is accountable for the way in which we moderns have conceived of progress. Take, for instance,

this typical passage from an article in a London newspaper :—

“ No reflecting mind can survey the daily bulletins of the world without realizing that the fields of science are ‘ white unto harvest,’ that we are on the verge of such an ingathering of applied knowledge and inventive skill as history has never known, and the boldest imaginations have never projected.

“ Within only the past few days there have been recorded a series of achievements in every one of which we can recognize a potency of unlimited radius for human employment. Dr. Low’s apparatus for transmitting vision by electricity comes hard upon the heels of the wireless telephone, and foreshadows a revolution in some of the most intimate conditions of existence. Putting these things together with the still fledgling power of wireless telegraphy, we may say that in principle the element of distance has been eliminated from the use of the senses.

“ And the evolution of the stable aeroplane has also, in principle, abolished the same factor in its relation to human viability. When this invention is absorbed into the complex of common life, the ordinary person will start in his aeroplane with the same nonchalance that he enters a boat or mounts a bicycle. But he will not—like the sailor or the cyclist—have to follow a circumscribed and irregular pathway. The maximum of motive power upon the earth’s surface is conditioned by this universal variation. Upon land you can never travel from point to point ; by sea or river you must heedfully obey the dictates of geology. But the air has no mountains or valleys ; behind its altering

currents and densities we have something like the glorious simplicities of abstract geometry.

"We can only faintly surmise the changes that will be wrought in human economy when traffic comes to need no track-laying. Professor Bachelet's invention of a magnetic railway with its train flying through the air, and linked to earth by the repulsion of a monorail, may be a serviceable supplement to the uses of true aviation. But it is no wild fantasy to entertain that all which has hitherto gone by the name of locomotion may ultimately be relegated to the repose of Nineveh by the facilities of the aerial highway, with the motor car crowning the pyramid in its revered rust, and the Panama Canal cherished as the last laborious accomplishment of terrestrial bondage.

"These things are but in their wonderful beginnings. We are fingering in our palms 'the seeds of time' . . ."

And so it runs on. There can be no question that this is a very wonderful story. Equally, there can be no question that things still more wonderful are to follow. But what does it all amount to? It simply means that we are going to move about a little more easily, that we may get news a little more quickly, and that a few more amenities and comforts may be added to our little span of life. But it does not mean that we are becoming a better race, or that we are multiplying the things that make for happiness. It does not mean that we are producing those things which make nations immortal: great philosophies, great literatures, great art, great sculpture. Mr. Houston Chamberlain truly says in "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century,"

that "nothing is probably more dangerous for the human race than science without poetry, civilization without culture"; which is only a modern version of the Hebrew sage's saying that "Where there is no vision the people perish."

I am not a mere traditionalist, crying down modern inventiveness. On the contrary, I hail every new invention with joy. I feel in my bones the thrill of this ascending effort. I rejoice in the creative energy, in the great human urge which has produced these things. What I am protesting against is our modern worship of scientific and technical achievement as though it were the greatest thing in life and represents the true highway of human progress. And the justice of my criticism may be seen in the fact that instead of subordinating our new devices to the purposes of life, we are subordinating life to them. We are compelling life to fit into them, and not them to suit the real ends of life. For instance, every labour-saving device ought to give us more time for reflection; as a matter of fact it only increases our hurry. That we are able to move about from place to place more quickly ought to add to the leisure of life. As things are it only adds to its pace. It speaks very clearly for the inherent sweetness of life that in spite of the conditions of high pressure and hurry under which great multitudes of our contemporaries are compelled to live, they still find life worth living at all.

All this misapplication of human skill arises from our materialism; and if you want the evidence of how mighty the grip of materialism is upon us, you have it in our childish and pathetic belief in non-moral force.

The way in which the nations of the west have multiplied warlike implements and provisions of all kinds, and the way in which we immediately inquire concerning a new invention whether it has a possible warlike use, indicate a state of dangerous blindness, not only to eternal values, but to the plain witness of human experience in all the ages.

All this proves how pressing it is that we should seek to recover a real and compelling sense of spiritual values,—which is only another way of speaking of a revival of religion. There is no department of our life in which it would not effect an immediate revolution. To begin with, it would recall us to a greater simplicity of life, and away from the elaboration and the embroidery with which we have been burdening our life in our generation; and this would immediately relax the tense and jealous concern for property and privilege which is the chief hindrance to domestic reform. We should see those external changes of condition for which the working classes are striving in the interests of a larger life, not wrested by main force from their unwilling “betters,” but readily and gladly conceded; and we should on the other hand see the working classes, in the light of the same spiritual quickening, re-interpreting their hopes and aspirations and formulating their requirements in a different way. We should, that is, see the beginning of a great process of reconciliation, the ultimate consequences of which it would be difficult to foretell.

It would be a pleasant and interesting task to speculate upon the whole extent of the reaction which such a revival of spiritual life would produce among

us. But fundamentally it would be the breaking down and the sweeping away of the barriers of personal and corporate selfishness. The spiritual life is the absolute antithesis of the self-centred life. Its ethic is the ethic of obedience and self-sacrifice and service. Nietzsche supplies us with the proper foil to the Gospel of the spiritual life. He preaches the Doctrine of the superman,—over against it, it is necessary to proclaim the Gospel of the Son of Man. The superman lives and realizes himself by the will to power; but “the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.” This is the choice which confronts us to-day. The spirit which has in the modern world received its crowning expression in Prussianism is essentially the spirit of Antichrist, the categorical negation of the Christian Gospel. It shows us in gigantic and monstrous form the one thing which Jesus Christ came into the world to save it from. It is the true authentic “original sin,” the “ape and tiger,” in man, organized, mobilized, reinforced by the achievements of civilization, rising up in its might to trample under foot the cross of Christ, and to put Him to an open shame. We have in a hundred ways expressed our abhorrence to it. But if we suppose that by opposing force to force we are going to destroy Prussianism, we are labouring under a very dangerous illusion. We may draw its teeth for a time; but we are not striking the root of the evil. We may render it innocuous on the political plane for a generation, but we shall by no means have disposed of it finally.

Nor is it our immediate duty to destroy militarism

in Germany. It may be our immediate duty on the political plane to arrest Pan-German aggressiveness and its menace to the peace of the world. But we may not forget that the roots of the evil are as wide as the race; and the difference between modern Germany and the rest of us is that Germany has carried out the materialistic principle far more thoroughly and much nearer its logical conclusion on certain sides than we others have done. Our immediate duty on the plane of moral principles is to see to it that we renounce for ourselves the evil thing for good and all, to break utterly and finally with materialistic conceptions of national life and to take up deliberately and whole-heartedly those ways of idealism along which we have achieved our greatest imperial triumphs,—those policies of trustworthiness, of service, of "hazardous benevolence" which have secured and consolidated our Empire. The present situation should make it plain beyond any peradventure that it is our business to seek for our national life a great baptism of spiritual idealism.

From such a baptism would spring up an enlargement of sympathy and a deepening of national unity which would forthwith transform our life both within and without. It would set afoot forces of reconciliation among ourselves which would straightway heal the ancient diseases of our commonwealth, would bring the churches together in a new fellowship of service and outlook, would purge our politics of bitterness and establish goodwill among the various classes of society. We should then be able to effect those social readjustments which have been so long overdue, and which have been resisted because of our selfish

materialism. It has been suggested that the British Empire is a symbol and a promise of what the whole world may become; and may not this be interpreted to mean that the word "*reconciliation*" really defines the world-mission of Great Britain? This is the task to which we are called; but we shall not be equal to it until the forces of reconciliation have permanently unified and cleansed and healed our domestic life.

The spiritual life is the solvent of all our difficulties. It suppresses our native self-regard and emancipates that good-will which secures respect for personality and nationality, and which will therefore do away with domestic and international strife. Mr. Grierson, in the essay already quoted, foreshadowed the consequences of the prevalence of materialism in words which, with some modification, may almost stand as a strikingly precise description of what has actually come to pass. "We may be at the beginning of the reign of a state of affairs the like of which the world has never known, a state of things which may cause a pandemonium of unrelenting fury in which all the so-called Christian nations become materialistic at heart, after playing at hypocrisy so long will throw off their masks and engage in an Armageddon of slaughter, in which the thing called humanity will have no part. . . ."* That is the logical end of materialism,—social confusion and war. Let us take the more excellent way. There is a Britain in the hearts of all of us, a Britain yet to be, free, sober, clean, happy, a land of merry, healthy children, of sweet and noble women, of strong and pure

* Francis Grierson, "The Invincible Alliance," p. 137.

men ; a Britain in which grey heads do not go down in poverty to the grave, neither is any man or woman exploited for the profit or prostituted for the pleasure of another ; a Britain cleansed from the dehumanizing lust of power and wealth ; a Britain which is a true, deep, unassailable brotherhood, a commonwealth of peace and good-will ; in whose streets there shall be none begging for bread, in whose cottages there shall be joy and tranquility and plenty, in whose palaces there shall be lowliness and simplicity and gentleness ; in whose courts there shall be immediate and equal justice, in whose politics there shall be no rancour or selfish aims ; in whose industry and commerce there shall be neither greed nor untruth. Nor is this Britain of our dreams so remote, if we do but seek after that renewal of spirituality in which we shall discover the modes of thought, the laws of conduct, and those sweeter ways of life which belong to the Kingdom of Christ. This is the supreme gift which will cleanse us of all mutual suspicion and bitterness, whether between persons or classes, parties or churches, which will add to our passion for liberty the abiding grace of a fellowship in which we shall gladly accept limitations and subordinate our personal interests to the common endeavour after a redeemed and redeeming Motherland, and which will thrust us forth on the divine task of reconciliation, to win all the peoples into a world-commonwealth of goodwill, freedom and peace.

A wild, impossible dream, says the cynic. But that is just what we expect the cynic to say.

HEADLEY BROTHERS' NEW BOOKS.

Robert Spence Watson.

A BIOGRAPHY

BY HIS NEPHEW, PERCY CORDER.

Illustrated.

Robert Spence Watson was a man of many-sided personality, a great citizen, and a strenuous worker in the cause of Education, an able writer, a forcible speaker and an ardent politician. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, he was one of a heroic little band who undertook the arduous service of distributing relief to the non-combatant victims of the war. His experiences during this time make thrilling reading even at this day. An enthusiastic member of the Alpine Club, with his friends he climbed the Alps from end to end. Perhaps the most picturesque episode in his foreign experience was in 1879, when, disguised as a Moor, he entered the sacred city of Wazan, an adventure of much difficulty and no little danger.

But it was in politics that Robert Spence Watson was most conspicuous. For over thirty years he worked strenuously for the Liberals of Newcastle. As President of the National Liberal Federation and in other ways he attained a position in the country which no other unofficial Liberal could challenge. He enjoyed the confidence of many great statesmen, and a selection from his correspondence with W. E. Gladstone, John Morley, Lord Grey, and others has been included in the biography.

Large 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

BOOKS FOR THE HOUR.

Reminiscences of the Franco-German War of 1870.

By WILLIAM JONES.

Hon. Commissioner of the 'Society of Friends' "War Victims' Fund" in France in 1870-71.

A very readable account of the author's experiences during the Franco-German War.

Cloth Boards, 1s. net; Paper Covers, 6d. net.

Atonement and Non-Resistance.

An attempt to show why the death of Christ was necessary. And a suggestion as to its bearing on Christian Ethics.

By WILLIAM E. WILSON, B.D.

Preface by HENRY T. HODGKIN, M.A., M.B.

Paper Covers, 6d. net.

Christ and War.

By WILLIAM E. WILSON, B.D.

The reasonableness of disarmament on Christian, humanitarian and economic grounds; a Peace Study Text-book.

PRESS OPINIONS.

"It is a fine sincere persuasive against war; and it is a valuable apologetic for Christianity."—*Expository Times.*

"We cannot conceive a better book for the study circle. It is clear, concise, scholarly, and yet easily read."—*Rev. Graham Wallis.*

"Should prove a valuable addition to our series of Adult School Text-books."—*One and All.* (W. C. Braithwaite.)

Cr. 8vo, 212 pp. 1s. net, cloth limp. 1s. 6d. net, cloth boards.

